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ABSTRACT

The Task Force reviewed literature relating to coordination and governance of higher education; identified methods used by the 50 states to secure state-wide coordination; developed criteria for evaluating these methods; and used these criteria in conducting 9 case studies. Recommendations for Missouri include the development of a coordinating agency based on a combination of the advisory agency and regulatory system models. This combination can preserve institutional autonomy and diversity while bringing about meaningful coordination among the programs of the separate institutions. (Author/CS)

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THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

from the

TASK FORCE ON STATE-LEVEL COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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A Report to C. Brice Ratchford
President, University of Missouri

GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION
OF HIGHER EDUCATION

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July 11, 1972

President C. Brice Ratchford
President, University of Missouri
University Hall
Columbia, Missouri 65201

Dear President Ratchford:

On December 1, 1971, you appointed a Task Force on State-Level Coordination and Governance of Higher Education. This Task Force has reviewed literature relating to coordination and governance of higher education; identified methods used by the 50 states of the United States and their efforts to secure coordination of higher education on a state-wide basis; developed a set of criteria for evaluating the coordination and governance of higher education; utilized these criteria in conducting case studies of nine states; and developed recommendations for consideration in coordination and governance in higher education in Missouri.

Members appointed to serve on the Task Force include:

Dr. Edwin Bailey
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July 11, 1972
Page 2

Consultants to the Task Force include:

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After the data were gathered in connection with the nine state visitations, extensive effort was necessary to complete the study. To provide continuity and sustained effort, a Steering Committee was formed. Members of this group were:

Dr. Rondal Downing
Dr. Donald S. Holm, Jr.


Dr. Edwin Bailey

Dr. Lynn W. Martin
Dr. Joe Saupe

While the efforts of the entire membership of the Task Force were extensive and the visitations could not have been accomplished in the period of time available without them, the Chairman is especially indebted to the Steering Committee for its efforts. Secretarial assistance, extending beyond what one could reasonably expect, was provided by Mrs. Betty Hackethorn, Mrs. Terry Jacobs, Mrs. Sharon Norris, and Mrs. Shirley Vredenburgh.

It is a pleasure to submit to you the attached report in its final form.

Sincerely yours,



Lynn W. Martin
Director of Intercampus Instruction

LWM/sln

Attachment

cc: Dr. Edwin Bailey
Dr. Rondal Downing
Dr. Donald Holm
Dr. Harrell Rodgers
Dr. A. G. Unklesbay

Dr. Robert Dollar
Dr. Elmer Ellis
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I

INTRODUCTION

The topic of state-level coordination and governance of higher education is of considerable interest across the country. Governors and state legislatures are interested because of their responsibilities for funding and for providing overall direction to higher education, particularly in the public sector. Existing state-level bodies for coordination and governance and their professional staffs are interested because of the opportunities available to them for contribution to rational and coordinated development of higher education. Executive officers, middle management staff, faculty, and even students of the colleges and universities are interested because of the varied ways in which state-level coordination and governance impacts the choices available to their institutions and in their academic and professional lives. Scholars of higher education, management, and political science are interested because of the provocative and practical questions raised by the topic. Finally, regional and national professional organizations serving one or more of these groups are interested for parallel reasons and for the potential they have for contribution and influence on the topic.

The study reported here was stimulated by a proposal to change the form of state-level coordination and governance of higher education in Missouri. In November, 1971, the State Reorganization Commission of Missouri (Second Little Hoover Commission) submitted to the Governor and the General Assembly a plan for completely restructuring the executive branch of state government. Citing the cost savings and increased efficiency that would result, the Commission proposed consolidation of some 87 administrative units into 10 executive departments, including a Department of Higher Education. That Department would be headed by a State Board of Higher Education, which would replace the present Missouri Commission on Higher Education. Members of the new state Board would be appointed by the Governor with approval of the state Senate. The plan envisioned continu-

ation of existing college and university governing boards, such as the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri and the boards of regents of what were then known as the state colleges.

The following major responsibilities for the State Board of Higher Education were recommended by the Little Hoover Commission in its general reorganization plan:

The State Board of Higher Education would have jurisdiction over statewide higher education policies. It would present a budget to the Governor for all higher educational programs, establish general admission policies, set charges and fee schedules, approve degree programs and make jurisdictional assignments among educational programs and institutions. The boards of curators and regents would have jurisdiction over institutional policies, faculties and property of their institutions, and matters not assigned to the State Board of Higher Education. (35)

The Board would thus assume broad responsibility for coordination of all public higher education policy, including responsibility for public junior colleges, which would be transferred to its jurisdiction from their present location under the State Department of Education. The State Board of Higher Education would also nominate members of the institutional boards of curators and regents for appointment by the Governor, with the approval of the state Senate.

In justification of these recommendations, the Little Hoover Commission cited what it deemed to be weaknesses of the present coordinating structure that would impair its ability to cope effectively with emerging problems in the field of higher education:

The Reorganization Commission recognizes that the Commis-

sion on Higher Education, as now operating, is performing a useful role through its budgetary recommendations and its studies in the interest of coordinating and improving higher education. Its role is only to recommend, however, and its independence is diluted since some administrators of institutions are assigned membership on the Commission by law.

With the mounting problems and costs of higher education, the need for coordination of the state government's largely independent institutions is increasing rather than diminishing. Presently, coordination is largely voluntary, but a study of the U. S. Office of Education makes clear the futility of relying on voluntary coordination. (35)

In support of that conclusion, the Little Hoover Commission quoted as follows from a 1950 U. S. Office of Education study:

As long as every institution gets what it wants, or at least what it can reasonably expect, all goes well.... But when a tough decision has to be made, and particularly when one or more institutions begin to feel that their plans for development are being thwarted, the actions of the (coordinating) council tend to be disregarded and before long it is either dispensed with completely or its actions are taken merely in a spirit of formality. (Report on the Study of the Structure of the State Tax-Supported Systems of Higher Education in Illinois, Division of Higher Education U. S. Office of Education, December, 1950, pp. 29-30).

Legislation designed to implement these recommendations through a constitutional amendment to be voted upon by the electorate was drafted by the State Reorganization Commission and pre-filed in both houses of the 76th General Assembly on December 1, 1971. Unlike the recommendations contained in the Little Hoover Commission report of November, 1971, the implementing legislation contained no "reserved powers" clause. The earlier report had

specified the powers of the institutional boards as follows:

The boards of curators and regents would have jurisdiction over institutional policies, faculties and property of their institutions, and matters not assigned to the State Board of Higher Education. (35)
(emphasis added)

The implementing legislation contained only the underlined portion of the above description of powers, eliminating the phrase "any matters not assigned to the State Board of Higher Education." After indicating the specific areas over which the new central board would have power, both the Reorganization Commission's initial recommendations and the proposed implementing legislation conferred upon that board a conceivably unlimited grant of power by giving it blanket "authority over other statewide higher education policies." Thus, through retention of this broad grant of power, elimination of the reserved powers clause, and failure to specify with any exactness the line demarcating central board versus institutional board functions, the implementing legislation would have effected a virtually complete centralization of power in the Missouri higher education.

Concern over possible effects of these sweeping changes upon Missouri higher education generally, and the University of Missouri in particular, led University President C. Brice Ratchford to appoint a nine-member Task Force on State-Level Coordination and Governance of Higher Education. The Task Force assignment included: (1) identification of the methods used by the 50 states of the United States in their efforts to secure coordination of higher education on a statewide basis; (2) evaluation of the actual experience of these states in order to assess the advantages and disadvantages of each of the different coordinating mechanisms; and (3) application of these findings to the Missouri situation, so that recommendations could be made as to the coordinating structure(s) most likely to meet the needs of the state and its institutions of higher education.

Task Force members undertook a review of the extensive literature dealing with coordination and governance of higher education. Selected for particular

attention were articles, reports, and monographs detailing recent (since 1950) experiences of the states having three basically different types of coordinating structures, as well as more general materials attempting to compare the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative methods of coordination.

The late 1950s and the 1960s were years of unprecedented expansion of post-secondary educational capacity in America. New institutions were established and old ones expanded to meet the increasing demand for a college education. Also seeking to build quality programs, colleges and universities of every size and caliber attempted to emulate universities of national distinction. Since those universities had achieved their renown through success in research and graduate teaching and through their ability to attract foundation support and federal grants, these became the principal emphases of almost all who aspired to prestigious status in higher education circles. Seemingly, there were ample (if not limitless) material resources to underwrite the financial costs of such expansion into the foreseeable future, thanks both to apparently unbounded federal government largesse and steadily expanding state tax revenues.

By contrast, the 1970s have thus far been a period of much harsher realities. Expansion of higher education facilities led to substantial increases in costs; the kind of education produced came to be questioned more and more critically by students, the general public, and educators themselves. As recipients of advanced professional and graduate degrees--and in some occupational fields, even baccalaureate degrees--began to glut the job market and to compete desperately for scarce or non-existent jobs, there developed widespread concern over the extent to which there had been overexpansion and needless duplication of higher education programs.

Contributing to these difficulties, there has been a general lessening of public confidence in American colleges and universities. This has resulted partially from a reaction to the role of the university campus as the principal locus of political dissent about the war in Vietnam, injustices in society's and government's treatment of minority racial and ethnic groups, and failure of the American system (including the university) to direct its resources to domestic problems that are given high priority by political dissidents. Perhaps even more instru-

mental in producing a devaluation of the university in the eyes of the general citizenry has been the public's distaste for some of the radical methods of political dissent employed by students, ranging from mass demonstrations to occasional acts of violence and destruction of property.

Meanwhile, both nationally and in most states, there began a wholesale reassessment of the priorities to be assigned various public problems. Matters of health, welfare, and environmental quality came to assume a status equal to or perhaps even greater than that customarily accorded higher education. Simultaneously, the federal government began to reduce or eliminate many types of financial support it had been giving to universities. At the state level, there was increasing public resistance to the constantly rising tax burden, with the consequence that many state and local governments found themselves hard pressed to meet normal incremental increases in costs of established programs, much less the costs associated with new programs. For the first time in many years, institutions of higher education had to compete on nearly equal terms with a wide and growing range of claimants for relatively scarce tax dollars.

Finally, there developed widespread concern both within and outside the university community as to whether institutions of higher education were themselves sufficiently responsive to new or emerging societal needs. Besides questioning the "relevance" of higher education, many of those having influence in state politics and government began to question the extent to which the colleges and universities were truly accountable to the people of the state for the effective use of public resources allocated to higher education. Both in the legislature and executive offices of state government, there developed a concern for the establishment of means for insuring orderly and rational distribution of these resources so as to meet statewide educational needs.

In almost all states, three major issues have by now become paramount in the field of higher education: (1) how to orient programs so as to meet the needs of the state's whole system of higher education, rather than have policy defined by the outcome of competition among institutions that are largely attempting to advance their own separate, parochial interests;

Table 1

NUMBER OF STATES CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF STATEWIDE STRUCTURE FOR
COORDINATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1940-1972

Type of Coordinating Structure	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1972</u>
None	33	28	17	7	2	2
Voluntary	0	3	6	3	2	1
Advisory Coordinating Agency	1	1	5	11	13	13
Coordinating Agency with Regulatory Powers	1	2	6	12	14	13
Consolidated Governing Board	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	48	48	50	50	50	50

(2) how to create a system responsive to new needs, having capacity for change and innovation, without producing a levelling of institutional quality that will preclude desirable differentiation in institutional missions and programs; and (3) how to insure that the public colleges and universities efficiently utilize the resources made available to them. These concerns have led state policymakers to seek greater centralization of decision-making authority in higher education, in the hopes that further concentration of power will lead to greater responsiveness and accountability.

The effects of orientation upon patterns of coordination and governance in higher education are apparent in the data set forth in Table 1.

Some 30 years ago, when college enrollments and state expenditures for higher education were at very modest levels, there appeared to be no need for inter-institutional coordination of higher education policy, and some two-thirds of the states had absolutely no mechanism devoted to that purpose. Of the remaining states, several could be said to have had "coordinating" mechanisms only by virtue of the fact that there was only one state-supported institution of higher education in the state.

This pattern did not change appreciably until the 1950s, when three distinct trends became evident. First, there began a marked decline in the number of states in which there were no coordinat-

ing mechanisms. Although there was a moderately strong trend toward reliance on voluntary coordination among institutions of higher education, especially in the 1950s, this pattern had also virtually disappeared by 1970. Instead, states turned with nearly equal frequency to advisory or regulatory coordinating agencies. Meanwhile, the number of states achieving coordination through utilization of a single governing board for all public colleges and universities, grew from 27 to 42 percent of the total between 1950 and 1972. In the last few years, at least two states (North Carolina and Wisconsin) which previously utilized regulatory coordinating agencies shifted to consolidated governing boards.

Overall, there has been a trend toward ever stronger forms of coordination. Changes in coordinating structures invariably have been from "weaker" to "stronger" coordinating mechanisms. However, until very recently, the strongest (consolidated governing board) form was utilized almost entirely in the smaller states, in those having few public colleges and universities, and in those with less complex systems of higher education. Obviously, it is much too early to tell whether the recent changes in North Carolina and Wisconsin foreshadow greater reliance upon the consolidated governing board as the instrument for coordination in larger states having substantial and complex structures of higher education.

The purpose of the Task Force was to assay the status and experience of the various structures for the state-level coordination and governance of higher education across the country, as a basis for deriving general conclusions and implications for the state of Missouri. More specifically, the purpose was to determine, as far as possible, the strengths and limitations of each of the major forms of state-level coordination and governance now in use, as a basis for drawing conclusions concerning the form or structure holding the greatest promise for the Missouri situation.

Presently, there are four basic types of structures for coordination and governance of higher education in the United States. However, state constitutional and statutory provisions of the several states create such differences in the details of these structures that no one classification scheme can faithfully represent all the variations that exist. Discussion of each of the four types does not presume to catalogue all these minor differences, nor to suggest that there is absolute uniformity within each type.

- A. No Formal Coordination. Each institution has a governing board which has either a constitutional or statutory base, but has broad responsibility for the institution it serves. There is no formal state-level coordinating agency for higher education, but there may be arrangements among the several institutions, perhaps recognized by statutes, for voluntary coordination.
- B. Advisory Coordinating Agency. Each institution has a governing board with responsibility for the institution or is one of several similar institutions governed by a common board. In addition, a state-level coordinating agency with staff assistance collects information, makes studies, and provides advice and recommendations to state government and to the institutions and their governing boards on matters related to higher education and its coordination and governance. The coordinating agency includes public members and

may include institutional or governing board representatives, typically, but not always, as a minority of the body.

- C. Coordinating Agency with Regulatory Powers. The coordinating agency has policy, regulatory, administrative, or governing authority in specified areas of higher education and employs a professional staff to assist it in the discharge of its responsibilities. Powers not given the coordinating agency (and not held by state government) are left to institutional governing boards which have less than complete responsibility for the institutions they serve. The specific powers granted coordinating agencies of this type vary so widely that, at one extreme, its "final authority" powers are so limited that it comes very close to being in the "advisory" category; at the other extreme, its powers are so broad that it approaches serving as a consolidated governing board.
- D. Consolidated Governing Board. A single board of control has responsibility for all public institutions of higher education in the state, except that public junior or community colleges may or may not come within its purview. A few states fit this pattern because there is only one public institution or one public four-year institution in the state. Where there is more than one college or university in the system, lay boards are sometimes retained for individual institutions, but their functions are solely advisory in nature. The pattern usually includes a strong central executive officer (President or Chancellor) reporting to the consolidated board.

Without this position (or even in a few cases with it) institutional executive officers report directly and separately to the board. The board is also served by a central professional staff.

Figure 1 presents a classification of the 50 states according to these four categories. This is the classification that has been used for the present study on the basis of judgments made about the structure in existence in the several states in 1971. Classification of any particular state is made difficult not only by the great variation in structural detail, but also by the fact that in almost any given year some change in structure occurs in one or more states. Sources for this classification include Berdahl (3) and Williams (40). The significant changes in structure for the states of North Carolina and Wisconsin are noted, but modifications in other states have also been made in recent years.

Having identified the structures to be compared, it is necessary to specify criteria for comparison. On what basis does one judge whether or not a coordinating or governing mechanism is effective? At one level, the answer to this question depends upon the perspective and bias of the individual providing the answer. A governor, a legislator, or a citizen might answer that the structure which produces the smallest total state appropriation for higher education is the best. Whether or not one agrees with that standard, surely cost is an important consideration. A college or university president or a member of an institutional governing board might answer that the structure which least restricts the administration and governance of his institution is best; certainly institutional autonomy and lay control at the institutional level are valid considerations. Members of coordinating agencies and professional staff thereof may have different answers based upon equally sound criteria.

Figure 1

A CLASSIFICATION OF THE 50 STATES BY PATTERN OF
STATE-LEVEL COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1971

<u>Pattern</u>		<u>States With Pattern</u>		
A. No Formal Coordination	(3)	Delaware	Nebraska	Vermont
B. Advisory Coordinating Agency	(13)	Alabama Arkansas California Kentucky Maryland	Michigan Minnesota Missouri Pennsylvania South Carolina	Virginia Washington Wyoming
C. Coordinating Agency with Regulatory Powers	(15)	Colorado Connecticut Illinois Indiana Louisiana	Massachusetts New Jersey New Mexico New York *North Carolina	Ohio Oklahoma Tennessee Texas *Wisconsin
D. Consolidated Governing Board	(19)	Alaska Arizona Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Iowa	Kansas Maine Mississippi Montana Nevada New Hampshire	North Dakota Oregon Rhode Island South Dakota Utah West Virginia

*Legislation enacted in 1971 will have the effect of moving North Carolina and Wisconsin to pattern D.

Figure 2

CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING STRUCTURES FOR COORDINATING
AND GOVERNANCE OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION

General

1. Program Control - Ability to establish sound pattern of institutional missions; to distribute programs among institutions in educationally sound and efficient manner; and to discontinue old and establish new programs in a rational manner.
2. Resource Allocation and Use - Ability to define fiscal needs on a coordinated and responsible basis in relation to specific institutional missions and overall staff needs. Includes consistency to budget development and presentation procedures, efficiency and effectiveness of procedures, and control and evaluation of application of resources.
3. Long-Range Planning - Ability to conduct continuous and meaningful long-range planning for higher education in the state for all post-secondary institutions and to implement the resulting plans.
4. Assignment of Responsibility - Ability to identify responsibility and accountability for conduct of higher education at institutional and state level. Includes an appropriate differentiation between responsibilities for broad policy establishment and management within policy guidelines.
5. Comprehensiveness of Purview - Degree to which structure for coordination and governance permits and encourages coordination among all segments of post-secondary education, including the private and community junior college sectors.

Influences

6. Institutional Autonomy and Influence - Ability of institutions to maintain individual educational character, to exercise appropriate control of own operations and approaches to assigned programs, and to bring institutional and educational considerations to bear in state-level decision making affecting higher education.
7. Lay Representation - Degree to which representatives of the lay public of the state participate in coordination and governance of higher education.
8. State Government Influence - Degree to which state government, executive and legislative, can influence development of higher education in concert with other programs of the state, while encouraging integrity and continuity of the higher education enterprise.

Administration

9. Span of Control - Degree to which coordinating and governing bodies and staff thereof are able to act on the basis of an adequate familiarity and understanding of the individual operating units and institutions for which they are responsible.
10. Costs of Bureaucracy - Degree to which staff and other dollar costs of the structure for coordination and governance can be kept at a level consistent with the overall requirements of the activity.
11. Processes of Bureaucracy - Ability of structure of coordination and governance to operate with the minimum necessary paper flow, review levels, and related attributes of bureaucratic processes.
12. Responsiveness - Ability of institutions and of coordinating structure to maintain the flexibility of operation required for timely and efficient response to specific needs and requirements.
13. Agency Staffing - Degree to which nature and responsibilities of coordinating or governing bodies permit the attraction of appropriately qualified staff.

This study was guided by a set of 13 criteria that were developed by the Task Force. They are listed in Figure 2 (P.7). Each of the listed criteria is considered to be reasonable, but not necessarily of equal importance with each of the others. A reader of this report may be expected to focus his attention on a limited set of criteria and to reject others as trivial or, at best, secondary in overall importance.

The 13 criteria for evaluation are arranged in three groups. The five general criteria include the central ones of "Program Control," which includes the consideration of undesirable program duplication; "Resource Allocation and Use," which includes considerations of "efficiency"; and "Long-Range Planning," which most individuals agree is a critical component of the coordinating function. Three of the criteria relate to the achievement of a desirable balance in the influences on state-level and institutional decisions affecting the course of higher education in the state. The final five criteria relate to aspects of the administration of the higher education system of the state.

The literature review and judgments of the investigators led to the study framework identified in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The implications of the 13 criteria for evaluating the viability of each of the four basic types of structures were then examined from the standpoint of organization and management theory. The results of this analysis are included as Chapter II of this report. These results are stated as postulates and hypotheses to be explored in the principal (case study) phase of the study.

Case studies of state-level coordination and governance were conducted in nine states. The purpose of the case studies was to assemble, on a first-hand basis, both facts and opinions that would contribute to an understanding of differences in the effectiveness and efficiency of the several patterns in use for state-level coordination and

governance. They were designed to collect evidence either supporting or refuting the several postulates and hypotheses derived in the Chapter II analysis.

The nine states which were the subjects of case studies were chosen from an original list of 19 states. These 19 were selected because they represent three of the four broad patterns of coordination and governance under investigation and because they are roughly comparable to Missouri in terms of size, complexity, and other characteristics. (The "no formal coordination" pattern was not included in the case study phase of the investigation because it was clearly not a viable alternative for the Missouri situation of the 1970s.) The original list of 19 states was cut to nine for case study purposes because of the relatively limited time and resources available for the study. The states visited included two or more from each of three types of coordinating and governing structures under study. Within each of the three categories, the states chosen were those most similar to Missouri in several relevant respects.

Chapter III provides more detail on the methodology of the case studies and summarizes the findings from them. Chapter IV is a discussion of the results of the case studies in terms of the principal purposes of the study. In this discussion the conclusions of the study are developed. A summary of the study, together with recommendations, are presented in Chapter V.

Three appendices, which report the results of subsidiary investigations that bear on the topic, are included following Chapter V. Some analyses of the levels of state appropriations to higher education in terms of several structures for coordination and governance are presented in Appendix A. Available data on salaries of chief administrators of state-level coordinating and governing bodies are examined in Appendix B, and a summary of the accomplishments and contributions of the Missouri Commission on Higher Education is offered in Appendix C.

II

POSTULATES AND HYPOTHESES

Organization for state-wide coordination and governance of higher education takes many forms. Theoretically, the form selected should be chosen because it meets certain criteria and is the best structure for achieving stated objectives. It needs to be recognized that organization is simply a tool of administration, providing a structure within which people relate to one another in accomplishing a mission. Organization has consequences for behavior; whether organizational goals are achieved depends in large degree upon how the activity of individuals and groups are affected by organizational structure. At the same time, behavior affects organization, and whether organizational goals are achieved depends on how well the goals of individuals and groups interrelate with the goals of the organization. Likewise, an organization operates in an economic, political, and social environment. Environmental forces often produce strong influences on the organization, as well as the individuals and groups within it, thus affecting the achievement of objectives.

As discussed in Chapter I, there are four basic structural approaches to the state-level coordination and governance of higher education. The first, laissez-faire in nature, provides for no state-level agency and lets each institution's governing board determine its own destiny, with or without regard to what other institutions in the state are doing. A second form utilizes an advisory coordinating agency. At the same time, these institutions have their own governing boards. This is currently the approach taken in Missouri. The third type utilizes a state-level coordinating agency with regulatory, as well as advisory, powers. Powers not granted the coordinating agency are left to institutional governing boards. Finally, there is the consolidated governing board structure. A single governing board has responsibility for all institutions.

Is one approach better than another? That depends on objectives and criteria for performance. Unlike the firm operating in a private enterprise economy, objectives and standards of performance in higher education are more diffuse, less tangible, and sometimes conflicting. Despite these limitations, it is possible to set forth some yardsticks for measuring performance. The 13 criteria for evaluation developed for this investigation were introduced in Chapter I and presented there in Figure 2 (P.7).

An examination of these criteria quickly reveals some potential conflicts. For example, is it possible to control programs and resources (criteria 1 and 2), and at the same time provide for responsiveness (criterion 12), as well as institutional autonomy and influence (criterion 6)? Is it possible to achieve some optimum balance between centralization and decentralization? Value judgments soon enter the picture. For example, one might argue that the overriding consideration is economy. Yet economy frequently can be achieved only by diluting the quality of educational programs and at considerable sacrifice in the ability of colleges and universities to be responsive to new or changing needs.

To cite another source of potential conflict, can a broad scope of jurisdiction for the state-level coordinating or governing body (criterion 5) be accompanied by sufficiently detailed knowledge of the units within its purview (criterion 9)? Can a single body possess the wisdom and comprehend the information required for the coordination or governance of many diverse types of institutions of higher education?

These potential inconsistencies among the criteria may exist no matter which type of coordinating or governing structure is in use. Even recognizing that fact, it still is fruitful to examine each of the structural types in order to specify expected consequences in terms of the 13 criteria. From this

examination certain postulates may be developed with respect to the strengths and weaknesses of the four approaches to state-level coordination and governance in higher education. These postulates are summarized in Figure 3.

In states lacking a formal structure for state-level coordination (Type A), coordination among institutions would be voluntary and perhaps coincidental with respect to program control and resource allocation and long-range planning. Virtually complete institutional autonomy would prevail. From the standpoint of "responsiveness" each institution presumably would have maximum flexibility to respond to what it perceived to be new needs and requirements, although broader state-wide needs might be overlooked or ignored. State government influence would be invited by the absence of an intermediary agency. Lay representation would exist on institutional boards. From the standpoint of administrative criteria, there would be no span of control problem. Bureaucratic costs and processes would be non-existent. There should be considerable flexibility of operation, since each institution would chart its own course through decisions made by its own governing board.

The advisory coordinating agency is designed to seek coordination on a cooperative basis. The central agency, having only advisory responsibility for program control and resource allocation and use, does not have the authority to enforce its recommendations. Institutional boards of control and state government may or may not be guided by coordinating agency recommendations. The structure suggests a significant long-range planning role for the coordinating agency. However, without authority to implement plans, such activities may be academic.

Responsibility and accountability rest at the institutional level. While the central agency would likely have a comprehensive purview, its responsibilities are merely advisory. Likewise, institutional autonomy and influence would be maximal. There would be a high degree of lay representation, and state government influence would be limited by the role assigned the coordinating agency.

From the point of view of administration, there would be no significant span of control problem. With a limited role, the coordinating agency would require a modest staff, entail minimal

cost, and engender little bureaucracy. The structure could enable institutions to respond to perceived needs.

The third form, a coordinating agency with regulatory powers, substitutes constitutional or statutory authority for cooperative efforts on some matters. Given the appropriate legal foundation and assigned role, there is potential for effective program control and resource allocation for the implementation of long-range planning. The ultimate effectiveness of activities depends upon the nature of the regulatory powers assigned the agency. While the potential for centralization is certainly present, the counter potentials for inter-institutional rivalries, limited institutional autonomy and loss of identity, and role conflict between the coordinating agency and institutional boards also exist. At the same time, the span of central agency control could be excessive, in the sense that it may not be adequately informed on matters relating to individual institutions.

The structure provides for broad lay representation. State government influence, on the other hand, is diminished in proportion to the role assigned the central agency.

Centralized decision-making, even of limited scope, usually necessitates a moderately large and costly administrative staff. Coordinative and approval procedures may result in time-consuming bureaucratic processes and limited responsiveness.

The consolidated governing board is a vehicle for achieving the highest degree of centralization in program control, resource allocation, and long-range planning. Responsibility for the governance of higher education would be fixed in the one board. If jurisdiction extends to all public institutions, comprehensiveness of purview would be broad, except for the private sector.

With such an approach, however, individual institutional influence and autonomy would be minimal and strong possibilities exist that desirable institutional diversity might be stifled. Individual institutional inputs could be lost in an extensive and expensive bureaucratic process. Likewise, the span of control of the governing board, in states with many institutions, could militate against effective administration, because members of the board would have neither the time nor knowledge of individual institutional problems and affairs to be able to make

Figure 3

POSTULATED CHARACTERISTICS OF STRUCTURAL FORMS

Criterion	Type A	Type B	Type C	Type D
1. Program Control	No Formal Coordination Entirely voluntary; no central authority or vehicle provided	Advisory Coordinating Agency Largely voluntary; Agency lacks required authority for control	Coordinating Agency with Regulatory Powers Agency may or may not possess authority required for effective control	Consolidated Governing Board Governing board possesses authority required for effective control
2. Resource Allocation and Use	No review process is provided	Agency may only recommend; no authority to reinforce recommendations	Effectiveness depends upon responsibilities assigned by law	Authority for resource allocation is clearly vested in board
3. Long Range Planning	No vehicle provided	Planning should occur; no authority for implementation	Planning should occur; authority to implement may or may not exist	Planning role and authority to implement clearly assigned
4. Assignment of Responsibility	Rests with individual institutions, only	Rests with individual institutions; agency is advisory only	Responsibility divided between agency and institutional boards; conflict inherent	Rests with consolidated board
5. Comprehensiveness of Purview	No provision for aggregate view	Purview likely to extend to all segments of higher education	Purview likely to extend to all segments of higher education	Purview likely to be limited to segments of public higher education
6. Institutional Autonomy and Influence	Complete institutional autonomy	Minimal restriction of institutional autonomy	Restriction of institutional autonomy depends upon responsibilities assigned by law	Autonomy shifted from institution to board
7. Lay Representation	Wide representation on institutional governing boards	Representation on institutional boards and on coordinating agency	Representation on institutional boards and on coordinating agency	Lay representation limited to single governing body
8. State Government Influence	Considerable state government influence	State government influence partially diluted by limited authority vested in agency	State government influence diminished by role assigned regulatory agency	State government influence minimized by comprehensive, independent role granted board
9. Span of Control	Non-existent	Manageable and attention concentrated at policy level	Regulatory powers draw agency into operational matters of institutions	Governing responsibility creates span of control problems
10. Costs of Bureaucracy	None	Modest	Considerable	High
11. Processes of Bureaucracy	None	Modest	Considerable	Excessive
12. Responsiveness	Maximum at level of institutions	Structure encourages responsiveness	Structure may impede responsiveness	Structure inhibits responsiveness
13. Agency Staffing	No staff involved	Staff quality commensurate with agency responsibility	Staff quality commensurate with agency responsibility	Staff quality commensurate with board responsibility

intelligent decisions. Lay representation is limited to the membership of the single consolidated board. The system has potential for minimizing state government intervention because of the absolute authority vested in the consolidated governing board.

It becomes perfectly clear from examination and comparison of the postulated strengths and weaknesses for each of the four forms, that major shifts take place from individual institutional control to central control. With centralized administration, theoretically at least, there would be absolute program control, a firm hold on overall resource allocation, a clear and comprehensive base for long-range planning and its implementation, and a distinct locus of responsibility. At first blush, if one is seeking "coordination", the consolidated governing board approach is the most promising. However, this model has drawbacks with respect to other important criteria, especially from the point of view of the vitality of the individual institutions. Innovation and institutional diversity may be threatened, as would individual autonomy and influence. Certainly, too, there are very real dangers that an expensive and cumbersome bureaucracy may develop. Such a bureaucracy brings with it, as well, the possibility that it could become an operating and managing agency rather than a coordinating, policy-making body. A consolidated governing board would provide for limited lay representation. As with any coordinating or governing body it might or might not be aloof from political influence.

One important conclusion is evident. It is unlikely that any one particular approach can lead to desirable results in terms of all of the 13 criteria. It has been postulated that each form of governance has both advantages and disadvantages. The decision as to which route should be followed must thus depend on relative weights one wishes to assign to each criterion.

Moreover, the extent to which any particular approach to governance is able to achieve selected objectives depends in large part upon behavior of the people selected to fill the organizational roles provided by the structure and upon other modifying influences. A statement by Dr. J. L. Miller, Jr., Professor of Higher Education at the University of Michigan, makes the point very effectively:

Some agencies have more power than their enabling legislation suggests because they are heavy on informal power, influence, and 'credibility' with state officials and the public. Other agencies have less power than the statutes suggest because their credibility is low and their recommendations are ignored. The web of informal relationships, communication, and respect among legislators and the state agency is extremely important and is often overlooked. Both legislators and agency personnel are well served when it exists. (32)

An illustration or two, in the context of the criteria previously defined, would be appropriate. Regardless of the structural form, effective long-range planning, program control, and resource allocation, for example, depend in large part upon the willingness of the governing body to assume those responsibilities, to face the issues involved, and upon the responsiveness of state government to the mechanism it has created. Under one kind of leadership a cumbersome and costly bureaucracy might be created for administration. Under another kind of leadership a sleek, smooth-functioning, and modest staff might discharge its responsibilities with efficiency and dispatch. It seems clear, too, that whether politics or statesmanship would prevail in the governance of higher education would also depend largely upon the particular people in the particular situation. Finally, what is of utmost importance is desire, confidence, dedication, and harmony, and these are not constitutional or statutory in nature.

Economics of the situation should not be overlooked. Attitudes toward program control and resource allocation, for example, are likely to be different in periods of financial prosperity than during austerity. At the same time, public attitudes toward higher education, changing as they do, are no small influence on program composition, resource allocation, and other equally important factors in the educational mix.

Two hypotheses emerge:

1. All other things being equal, each of the basic approaches to governance

can be expected to function as specified by the postulates.

2. All other things are not equal. Human, economic, and political influences are strong modifiers affecting processes and accomplishments. While structure must provide a minimum framework within which people can effectively work, the modifying influences are sig-

nificant factors in the success or failure of any particular approach to governance.

To test these hypotheses a field study was conducted. Its purpose was to evaluate each of the forms of governance in terms of the criteria, taking into account, insofar as possible, the modifying influences operative in the particular states under study. Results of these efforts constitute the substance of the next two chapters.

III

CASE STUDIES

Many individuals and organizations have studied state-level coordination and governance from a number of perspectives. From the literature, four principal patterns for state-level coordination and governance were identified and the 50 states were categorized on the basis of the pattern now in use.

A sample of 19 states roughly comparable to Missouri in a number of relevant respects, and representing different patterns of higher education coordination and governance, was initially reviewed. Nine of these states, representing a range of the general patterns of coordination and governance in use, were selected for intensive study. Individual investigators traveled to these states and conducted interviews with representatives of (a) one or more of the public institutions of higher education, (b) the state coordinating or governing body, and (c) state government. In each of these states a wide range of individuals knowledgeable of and concerned about higher education in the state were interviewed.

The interviews in each state were completed in a period of two to three days. The number of interviews conducted in a state varied between six and 15, with the typical number being eight. The case study visits were made between December 27, 1971, and March 10, 1972.

A standard interview format, based upon the previously described 13 criteria for evaluation, was used in each interview conducted. This standard format was not, however, mechanically followed. The interview approaches of the several investigators varied from directive to non-directive, depending upon the position of the individual being interviewed, but the objective of securing information on the 13 criteria was sought and generally achieved. At the conclusion of each visit, the investigator prepared a case study report. There was an expected variation in the style of these

reports. After all case study visits had been completed and case study reports prepared, these reports were condensed into the common format appearing on the following pages. The interviewer reports which follow contain a brief introductory description of the system of higher education in existence in the state, and summary and evaluative observations and comments on the coordination and governance of higher education in the state in terms of each of the 13 criteria.

In all cases the individuals interviewed were highly cooperative and were candid in their comments. The interest of all individuals interviewed in the topic under study was obvious. An additional reason for the cooperation and candor that occurred in the interviews was the guarantee of anonymity that was given to the individuals interviewed. It is essential that this anonymity be preserved, despite the fact that it detracts from the meaningfulness of the interview reports by obscuring to some degree the precise perspectives of the individuals interviewed.

The nine states for which reports are presented below are identified as follows: States B-1 and B-2 follow the advisory coordinating agency pattern. States C-1, C-2, and C-3 have coordinating agencies with regulatory powers. States D-1, D-2, D-3, and D-4 follow the consolidated governing board pattern.

B-1

The advisory coordinating agency for higher education in State B-1 was established by its legislature within the last decade. In addition to administering certain statewide post-secondary activities, the legislature charged the agency with responsibility for gathering and studying all phases of higher education, developing necessary plans and programs to meet post-secondary needs, engaging in long-

range planning and, as necessary, cooperating with neighboring states and agencies of the federal government in these activities.

The coordinating agency now consists of 11 members, including one from each of eight congressional districts and three at-large members. Members are appointed by the Governor with approval by the Senate. This represents a recent change from a previous composition consisting of 20 members which included representatives from each of the five segments of post-secondary education. These segments are the junior colleges, the vocational-technical institutes, the state colleges, the University, and the private colleges. Under the new structure, the professional representatives from the five segments constitute an advisory body for the coordinating agency. The revised statute recommends that new programs be reviewed by the coordinating agency, merely legitimizing a previously established practice of the agency. Statutory provisions, however, do not provide for budgetary review by the agency.

Program Control. Program control, including approval or denial of new programs, is exercised by the agency within the framework of a long-range plan. With respect to the establishment of new campuses, and with one potential exception, the legislature has been responsive to the recommendations of the agency.

Resource Allocation. The agency does not review or make recommendations on institutional budget requests. It does, however, receive and administer funds for special programs which include the state's grant-in-aids program, inter-institutional library acquisitions, and computer utilization. It has also set policy regarding the levels of tuition income with respect to the total operation budgets of the several institutions. The agency is in the process of studying the feasibility of recommending a basic formula for funding all types of public institutions of higher education in the state. If a formula is developed, recommended by the agency, and acted upon by the legislature, then the agency will have made a significant contribution shaping the guidelines for resource allocation.

Long-Range Planning. The major strength of the agency has been long-range planning. The expansion of the agency's working staff to over 30 has enabled it to conduct the studies, collect the data, and prepare long-range planning reports expected of it. Although the long-range recommendations of the agency are of recent origin, there is evidence that its plans have been reviewed carefully by the legislature and do, in fact, influence legislative decisions regarding establishment of new campuses, initiation of new programs, and extension of post-secondary education in the state.

Assignment of Responsibility. The precise role of the agency is clearly coordinative rather than regulatory. Ultimate responsibility clearly rests with the several multi-campus and multi-institution governing boards. While each of the governing boards is aware of its responsibilities, they are sensitive to the role of the coordinating agency.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. The purview of the agency is complete with its coordinating role extended to include the following segments of post-secondary education: junior colleges, vocational-technical institutes, state colleges, the University and its branch centers, and private colleges.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. The coordinating agency causes a minimal restriction to the autonomy of the public institutions and their governing boards. Institutional respondents reported that the multi-campus and multi-institution governing boards cause a greater restriction on their autonomy than does the coordinating agency. In addition, one segment of public higher education involves local boards as well as the multi-institution board for this segment.

Institutional influence on deliberations of the coordinating agency is provided for by an advisory body composed of the chief administrators of the several segments of higher education.

Lay Representation. Lay representation exists at two levels for junior colleges, state colleges, and the University, and at three levels for vocational-technical institutes and the private colleges. Lay representation in the decision-making processes in higher education is indeed pervasive. The recent restructuring of the agency to include only lay citizens further

reinforces the high degree of representativeness for the citizens of the state.

State Government Influence. The strength of the agency is reflected in the respect it has gained from the legislative branch. Recommendations of the agency have been carefully studied and numerous hearings have been conducted by legislative committees to comprehend the agency's plans and proposals. While some legislative action in the higher education arena has been characterized by political intrigue, for the most part the relationship between the agency and the legislature has been one of mutual trust and cooperation. According to the director, this legislative confidence exists because the agency does effective staff work before submitting its recommendations and long-range plans.

Span of Control. The span of control of the agency is limited from one perspective and extensive from another. If span of control applies to multi-campus and multi-institutional boards, the agency's span is manageable because only five units relate to it directly. If reference is made to single institutions, however, then the span of control applied to the five major segments seems to be working well and it appears the agency confines itself to broad policy matters.

Costs of Bureaucracy. The costs of bureaucracy for the agency are comparatively low, despite the current staff size of approximately 30. A significant proportion of the staff and budget of the agency is related to the special programs (library acquisitions, grants-in-aid, computer, and facilities) administered by the agency. There is evidence that the activities and staff of the coordinating agency have had a "multiplier" effect at the governing board and institutional levels. Staff and costs at these levels have been added in response to requests for information and related activities of the agency.

Processes of Bureaucracy. Despite the fact that the coordinating agency itself is not especially bureaucratic in nature or form, there remains a built-in bureaucratic process from the point of view of an individual institutional faculty member or administrator. There are hearings and administrative guidelines to contend with at the governing board level prior to reviews by the coordinating agency. In addition, there is the final level of

legislative review and decision-making. While each of these three levels by no means precludes innovation or creative planning, the total structure would seem to have inhibiting features which might reasonably be classified as the processes of bureaucracy.

Responsiveness. For the reason that the agency is coordinative rather than regulatory, it must assume a stance of responsiveness to whatever is brought before it by its five constituencies. To the extent that agency staff can identify salient problems and pressing needs of higher education in the state, it is capable of encouraging its constituency components to respond with appropriate action.

Agency Staffing. The agency's staff is not disproportionately large in terms of its statutory charge for at least two reasons. First, the director seeks to maintain a low profile image. Secondly, there is a difficulty in attracting top-ranking professionals to the staff because of the policy of fixing by statutes all state annual salaries exceeding \$15,000. Several interviewees appeared to be less than impressed with the current staff and desired more vigorous leadership. It was clear, however, that the service approach, with its emphasis on data collection, mediating, and planning, has appealed to state legislators.

B-2

The coordinating agency in State B-2 was created by statute approximately five years ago. This agency, which renders advice to state government and to the institutions of higher education, has program review, long-range planning, and budget review responsibilities. The governance of public higher education is vested in the governing board for the multi-campus University of State B-2 and the State Board of Education. The latter board has responsibility for the several regional universities of the state, for the relatively small number of community colleges, and for the area vocational schools and technical institutes, in addition to its responsibilities for public education at the elementary and secondary levels.

Within the last year, a Governor's Task Force has completed a report on the Governance of Higher Education. The Task Force recommended that the position of the existing coordinating

agency be strengthened, urged retention of the present governing structure for the University of B-2 in its present form, and recommended that a state university system with its own board be established to govern the universities now regulated by the State Board of Education.

Program Control. The coordinating agency has no formal mechanism for reviewing requests for new programs and new organizational units. There was limited evidence of definition of institutional missions. Support for new programs and the development of new institutions appears to be provided by the agency when such support is sought and when public pressure is exerted. It was agreed that more effective planning for physical facilities and increased attention to program duplication are needed. It was stated that program additions in the future will need to be matched by program reductions.

Resource Allocation. The coordinating agency has developed a reputation for fairness and impartiality among the institutions of higher education it serves in the state. It has put into operation new budget review procedures which are reported to be more objective and equitable than those used in the past. Considerable emphasis is placed on the formula approach to budget review. The agency has stressed that formula-based budgets should be fully funded. Consideration is being given to a formula with special provisions for disadvantaged students. Considerable input detail is required from the institutions for the budget building process. The agency validates requests and acts as a third party referee in the budget process. Generally, it was felt that the agency has assisted in decreasing competition and rivalry for the budget dollar.

Long-Range Planning. There is evidence that the agency is involved in a minimum of long-range planning. There was no long-range plan displayed. The University of State B-2 staff probably engages in more long-range planning than the coordinating agency. However, the agency has been forced into some state-wide analyses beyond that completed by the University of State B-2, because of the aggressiveness of one of the state universities governed by the State Board of Education.

Assignment of Responsibility. The responsibilities of the two existing governing boards are clear. The coordinating agency exercises only an advisory role. It has been recommended that the University of State B-2 retain its present form of governance. It has been recommended that a state university system with its own board be established to govern the universities now governed by the State Board of Education. It would appear that the confidence in and the credibility of the State Board of Education as it relates to higher education have diminished. It has been further recommended that the community colleges in the state have their own board. And, finally, the present coordinating agency has been recognized for a job well done and it has been urged that this agency be given more power and recognition in coordinating and planning for higher education. It would appear that the agency has in some instances avoided difficult issues for the sake of harmony and retained a low profile reputation where a spirit of cooperation is highly valued.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. Technically all segments of public higher education come within the purview of the coordinating agency. However, it appears that the agency functions primarily through keeping lines of communication open and maintaining a cooperative attitude. Apparently the agency works very effectively with the four-year institutions governed by the State Board of Education. It is also reported that the agency is actively providing coordination with the private institutions of higher education, and that this coordination will probably continue in the future. There is some agency frustration due to the federal government's infusion of money into some underdeveloped institutions in the state.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. All of the institutions of higher education in the state are highly autonomous, and the agency does not interfere with this autonomy. The agency is known for its ability to develop cooperation between institutions. It has been formally complimented and the suggestion made that it be designated to assume a greater role in planning and coordination in higher education.

Lay Representation. By virtue of the combination of governing boards and the coordinating agency, there is significant lay representation for the conduct of the affairs of higher edu-

cation in the state. Membership on the board was reported to be well distributed geographically, bipartisan in nature, and representative of minority groups. There is a minimum of friction between staff members and higher educational personnel in the state. The agency does not appear to want a great deal of authority, perhaps because it carries with it too much accountability; however, the staff and board of the agency include high quality personnel and influential individuals.

State Government Influence. There was no evidence of undue state government influence on the agency. Apparently an open, vital, and direct contact prevails with the Governor's office, as well as with the institutions of higher education. However, since the agency has been in existence only four years, it may be too early for a question of credibility to develop. On the other hand, there appears to be limited public understanding of the activities of the agency.

Span of Control. Because the agency appears to deal with broad issues rather than detailed operational matters, there is no apparent span of control problems, despite the wide variety of institutions for which it is responsible.

Costs of Bureaucracy. While no coordinating agency budget figures were obtained, it was apparent from the small staff and its physical surroundings that the cost was low.

Processes of Bureaucracy. The informal relationships between the coordinating agency and the institutions have produced a minimum bureaucracy. The complaints about paper flow were minimal. Agency deadlines for submission of information were reported to be reasonable.

Responsiveness. All concerned in the state seem to be making a conscious effort to make the system work. There is a minimum amount of time lag and delay in agency review. The result is that the present machinery for the agency's nominal coordinating role is adequately responsive.

Agency Staffing. The quality of the staff is considered very good by most individuals in the state. The staff enjoys confidence from the clientele they serve. Individuals conducting the interviews in State B-2 were impressed with the quality of the agency staff.

C-1

The coordinating agency in State C-1 was created by statute within the last 10 years and followed a long-established, institutionally sponsored organization for voluntary coordination. In a recent year, the original statute was amended and the position of the agency was strengthened, but its essential role was not significantly altered. The agency consists of nine laymen appointed by the Governor for terms of four years. There is an advisory committee of representatives of the institutional governing boards and the legislature, which meets with the coordinating body without vote.

The agency has responsibilities which encompass all public and private higher education in the state. In the public sector these responsibilities relate to the state universities which have individual governing boards, to the several state colleges which have a common governing board, and to the more numerous community junior colleges which have a single, central governing board. There are a limited number and variety of institutions in the private sector.

The statutory responsibilities of the coordinating agency include: (a) statewide planning with review and approval authority for institutional plans; (b) program review with authority to approve or deny proposed new degree programs and academic organizational units; (c) prescription of uniform fiscal and other reporting forms and procedures; (d) budget request procedures, including prescription of forms and procedures, with executive and legislative branch approval, and review and recommendations on operating and capital budget requests; (e) automatic data processing review of plans and operations; (f) student financial aid administration; and (g) federal program administration.

Program Control. The coordinating agency has a formal and appropriate mechanism in operation for reviewing requests for new programs and new organizational units, but is only beginning to consider undertaking reviews of existing programs. It has a similar review mechanism for capital programs. Institutional missions appear to be moderately well defined. Essentially all requests for new degree programs receive approval, and a number of new institutions have been

created on the basis of recommendations from the agency. Despite the "final" authority of the agency in the initiation of new degree programs, one request is currently being held up on the basis of "quality," but degrees in the program have been awarded by the institution!

Resource Allocation. The coordinating agency staff works with staff of the state budget office in the development of legislative budget request forms, analyzes institutional requests in considerable detail using statistical standards and formulas, and forwards recommendations to state government. Considerable input detail is required from the institutions. The use of quantitative standards and formulas may result in "common" treatments of the various institutions, with less than full recognition of individual programs and institutional missions. There appears to be more influence from state government than from the institutions on the form of budget analysis undertaken.

The agency has served to diminish inter-institutional competition and rivalry for the budget dollar. Competition among the executive branch of state government, the traditionally strong legislative budget committee, and other elements of the legislature for influence and power in state budget development has intensified in recent years as the Governor has sought to strengthen his powers in this and other areas of state government. The coordinating agency, the institutions of higher education, and other state agencies and programs have been involved in this competition. Conflicts resulting from this situation, and the number of separate entities seeking to influence the higher education budget, have combined to produce a pattern of budget development that is considerably less than orderly.

Long-Range Planning. The coordinating agency engages in long-range planning and is assisted in this effort by grants of federal funds. A long-range planning document was published by the agency about two years after it was created and a second such publication was recently released. The more recent statement is commendable in some respects and probably compares favorably with similar publications for many of the other states. However, on other counts it is not a "model" long-range plan. For example, the techniques used in projecting enrollments are far from sophisticated and

enrollment projections must be a cornerstone of any long-range plan for higher education. Several of the individuals interviewed in the state expressed the concern that this plan failed to address several of the more fundamental issues that confront higher education in the state. It appears that the agency's on-going responsibilities for budget and program review and program administration have served to relegate long-range planning to a second priority status. Significantly, as individuals who were interviewed discussed specific decisions made by state government or by the coordinating agency, they did not make references to the agency's long-range planning statements as a source of guidance on the decisions reached. Capital planning for the institutions is also stimulated and controlled by the agency in a formal way.

On a specific point, the coordinating agency has defined "enrollment ceilings" for a number of the institutions, and these ceilings have been incorporated in recent legislative appropriation acts and are now affecting the two or three largest institutions. One individual interviewed suggested that this development came as a result of overbuilding new institutions in the 1960s and the consequent need to redirect students to the newer institutions.

Assignment of Responsibility. Role assignments for the agency and the institutions are reasonably clear in the statutes. The coordinating agency has operational responsibilities (for student aid, for allocation of computer resources, for capital projects, and special projects) that draw it into administrative activity. The constitutional independence of the University, alongside the statutory responsibilities and authority of the coordinating agency, is a fundamental inconsistency, but the inconsistency has not surfaced and the agency has apparently not been tempted to raise the issue. On this, as on other points, the agency has apparently avoided some "hard" issues in the interest of harmony.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. All segments of public higher education come within the purview of the coordinating agency. Information from the private sector is collected and reported by the agency and this sector is, on its own terms, included in long-range planning. The agency has had a

particularly positive influence on the development of the junior college and vocational-technical education sector.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. Evidently the University has not felt its (constitutionally-provided) autonomy to have been appreciably threatened by the coordinating agency. However, the legislative appropriations acts, which are based upon and include statements of legislative assumptions concerning operating details of academic programs, have been felt to intrude upon institutional prerogatives. The academic autonomy of the other institutions is similarly affected by the coordinating agency and the legislature, but the fact that they are statutory and not constitutional agencies is a factor that makes their situations in this regard somewhat different.

There are committees of staff from the institutions that advise coordinating agency staff on a variety of issues. At the coordinating board level, institutional influence is provided for by (non-voting) advisory members of the board. One advisory member is a president of an institution; the others are members of governing boards. Advisory members do not attend executive sessions of the coordinating board. Institutional influence is somewhat limited, because the coordinating agency feels a closer allegiance to state government than to the institutions. Indeed, the staff director has stated that the agency is not an advocate for higher education.

Lay Representation. The combination of institutional boards and the coordinating agency provide potential for lay representation in the conduct of the affairs of higher education. There are suspicions and allegations that in both bodies staff wield too much influence, but at least the members of the coordinating board are evidently encouraged to make their own decisions. Voting members of the coordinating board are bipartisan and reflect geographical and minority group representation.

State Government Influence. The coordinating agency functions largely as an agency of state government and, while representing higher education, does not serve as an advocate for higher education with state government. In a recent year, the agency and the executive budget office prepared a joint operating budget recommendation. A recent executive reorganization formed a Department of Higher Education

with the director of the coordinating agency as its head. As a matter of fact, this reorganization has raised the issue of whether the coordinating agency serves the (now strengthened) executive or the (formally predominant) legislative branch. In fact, it attempts to serve both. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the agency is significantly influenced in its deliberations by state government "political" forces. The closeness of the agency to state government can serve the interests of higher education. For example, in a recent case, the director of the agency was successful in preserving the "faculty-type" classification of administrators in a new state-level personnel classification project. Despite the relationship of the coordinating agency to state government, there have been instances of legislative action which ignored agency advice or was taken without the benefit of its advice. Because of this relationship, the intent of agency actions are frequently questioned at the institutional level.

Span of Control. There is a considerable diversity of types of institutions (from vocational-technical schools to the multi-purpose University) for which the coordinating agency is responsible, but the number probably does not make the agency's span of control unmanageable. While there may be some question about the adequacy of the background and preparation of the members of the agency and its staff for the responsibilities they assume, there is almost certainly more expertise there than in the executive or legislative branches of state government. A new committee structure has been recently initiated, but is not yet clear that the committees are contributing appreciably to the efforts of the agency. The span of control question is influenced by the agency's involvement in operational matters. Major policy issues are more manageable under a given span of control than are detailed operational matters.

Costs of Bureaucracy. The agency staff currently includes 10 professional and eight clerical positions, but five of the positions are funded from federal sources and two are separately funded administrative data processing positions. Thus, 11 are pure, state funded coordinating positions. At the institutional level, an appreciable amount of staff and other resources are used in developing information in the formats requested by the coordi-

nating agency and in meetings and negotiations with coordinating agency staff. One University respondent estimated that two full-time-equivalents of institutional middle-management staff time, and \$250,000 per year ("on the conservative side") of University resources, were used in connection with the coordinating agency. Another institutional representative suggested that "the dollar cost alone of the coordinating agency is on the order of five times as great as any 'fat' it could find in institutional budgets. The 'fat' might as well be left with the institutions and, by eliminating the agency, save the taxpayers money." It is, of course, not known whether or not this allegation can be substantiated.

Process of Bureaucracy. The coordinating agency and institutional staff work mentioned above does create an appreciable amount of paper flow. For example, an institution submits 20 copies of a multiple-page document to seek approval for a new degree program. Though deliberation does take place, essentially all such requests have been approved within the 90-day period prescribed for the review. Instances of considerably extended reviews can be cited, however. The paper flow and processes of operating and capital budget reviews are particularly extensive. The involvement of the coordinating agency in several operational matters needs to be noted.

Responsiveness. Institutional respondents frequently noted time lags and delays brought about by coordinating agency reviews and special requests for information, but any added review level requires time to exercise its responsibility. The 90-day period in which requests for new programs are processed does not appear excessive and has usually been met. A representative of the coordinating agency suggested that the agency has the ability to respond unencumbered by the traditional inertia of colleges and universities.

Agency Staffing. Respondents from the more senior institutions expressed reservations about the quality of agency staff, noting that employment in coordinating agencies is less attractive to able individuals than is employment at a college or university. Coordinating agency staff pointed out that a career pattern and profession in state-level coordination is now developing. It is probably a

fair generalization that agency staff are less well qualified than middle management staff at the two or three more senior institutions, but at least on a par with the staff at the less well-established institutions. It may be awkward for a University vice-president to negotiate with a second echelon coordinating agency staff individual, but the same member of the coordinating agency staff may possess expertise that is useful to the less well-developed institution in the state. The salary of the director of the coordinating agency is comparable with that of a state college president, and that of his two principal associates is on a par with those of state college vice-presidents. There would be agreement that the quality of the agency staff has been improving, though not that this quality is yet coordinate with the responsibilities assigned it.

C-2

Following more than a decade of intense competition among its universities and colleges over levels of state financial support and over the location of academic and professional degree programs, state C-2 in the 1960s created a coordinating agency with regulatory powers. Supporters of legislation creating this agency expected the new arrangement to blunt the sometimes bitter inter-institutional conflict over resources, thus permitting a more rational and orderly approach to problems of administering and funding public higher education in the state. However, this reorganization left intact the existing institutional governing boards.

The resulting structure for the coordination and governance of higher education has at its apex a regulatory coordinating agency consisting of lay members appointed by the Governor for six-year terms; the chairman of each of the state's university and college boards, the chairman of the junior college board, and the state superintendent of public education, all who serve ex-officio. The gubernatorially appointed lay members comprise slightly more than 60 percent of total coordinating agency membership.

This coordinating agency has three principal functions: (1) review of budget requests of the state junior colleges, senior colleges, and universities and transmission of these re-

quests, along with coordinating agency recommendations, to the Governor and the state legislature; (2) review (approval or denial) or all institutional requests for the establishment of all new units of instruction, research, or public service to be undertaken by the state universities and colleges; and (3) examination of the needs of higher education in the state, preparation of a master plan for the development of higher education, and making recommendations to the state legislature relating to legislation needed to implement or modify the master plan. While some of these functions are advisory only, the agency has broad authority to approve or disapprove new programs or organizational units in existing institutions, and to approve or disapprove the establishment of new institutions. This authority is subject only to the power of the legislature to reverse agency decisions.

Beneath the regulatory coordination agency are institutional boards, some having control over several institutions, that govern about a dozen four-year colleges and universities in the state. In addition, there are more than 30 junior colleges, all under the common governance of a state-wide junior college board. Each of these institutional boards possess duties and powers normally allotted to college and university boards, except insofar as they are expressly limited by the powers and duties assigned to the regulatory coordinating agency.

Program Control. There is general agreement that program evaluation criteria used by the coordinating agency are often inappropriate and inadequate. Reputedly, the agency is aware of this, and the agency's chief executive and staff desire to work with university administrators to devise new and better criteria.

It is also charged that the coordinating agency frequently will ask for a mountain of data on operating costs, all of them designed to prove some conclusion that the agency had already reached, or some point it wished to make, but which the data requested could not really support, or could support in the form of half-truths, at best.

In addition, there are complaints that the coordinating agency has used faulty analysis in arriving at many of its conclusions regarding program duplication and many of its recommen-

dations pertaining to program elimination or change. The agency's chief executive is said to be aware of this problem, and of the fact that the agency has frequently used simplistic and sometimes bogus cost formulas in performing its program review function.

There is also consensus that the coordinating agency has taken the wrong approach in a current effort to secure a redistribution of higher education expenditures by insisting that each university identify its "lowest priority programs." University administrators argue that this is not an intelligent way to reduce the level of program activity and expenditures on a campus, since open designation of certain programs as low priority tends to produce a quick deterioration in their quality.

Resource Allocation. Some university administrators charge that the coordinating agency has used its budget recommendations in devious ways, in order to accomplish purposes often unrelated to the budget matter in question. For example, in its recommendations for one university, the coordinating agency recommended several million dollars in salary increase funds, but then did not recommend sufficient total funds to cover the salary raises. By this strategy, the coordinating agency in effect was dictating that the funds needed for that purpose would be generated through cost savings by elimination of some programs in that particular university.

It also was charged that the coordinating agency has engaged in outright duplicity in its budget recommendations. For instance, the agency is said to have omitted several million in retirement benefits that should have been included as expenses for one university, even though the agency had requested information about the scope of those expenses just a few days prior to the release of the agency's proposed budget. The agency staff is alleged to have purposely ignored these amounts in compiling its budget recommendations.

There is considerable disagreement as to whether the coordinating agency has statutory authority to alter institutional budget requests, or whether it is empowered only to pass them along to the legislature with whatever recommendations it wishes to make regarding them.

Long-Range Planning. The planning activity undertaken by the coordinating

agency appears to be among the more thorough and imaginative planning efforts carried on by any state system of higher education in the nation. To the dismay of the universities, the coordinating agency seems to be intent on implementation.

According to the point of view on one campus, the coordinating agency obtained views from a great many sources in the most recent phase of the master planning process. Those inputs were not of equal quality; nor had they been thought out with equal care. Yet the agency staff had such a diversity of opinion presented to it that it could pick and choose whatever it wished to, for whatever purpose it had in mind. This criticism aside, there has been broad involvement in the planning process by both the academic community and representatives of the general public.

Assignment of Responsibility. Some institutional administrators and faculty feel that the coordinating agency has overstepped its proper bounds by interfering in matters that are best left to the discretion of administrators and faculty at the campus level. The example cited most often is a recently issued agency report which makes detailed recommendations about specific operating programs at the university system and campus level.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. The purview of the coordinating agency extends to all sectors of higher education, including private higher education. Indeed, much dissatisfaction with the agency results from a feeling on the part of public university faculty and administrators that the coordinating agency has too vigorously espoused the cause of private higher education, principally through its recommendations for state appropriations for scholarships that can be used at either private or public institutions.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. University administrators and faculty complain of infringements upon institutional autonomy. In one sense, they are actually arguing against any meaningful coordinating effort, especially one that might involve a redistribution of resources.

The regulatory coordinating agency and its staff are said by some to be isolated from and without important inputs from the faculty and students of the universities, despite the extensive advisory structure which exists.

But other administrators, from other universities, deny this categorically, saying there is ample opportunity for two-way communication between the coordinating agency and the people in the universities.

Lay Representation. The coordinating agency's executive director and staff play a preponderant role in the agency's decision-making processes. Thus, lay members are inclined to defer to the staff, particularly on the most complex questions requiring agency action. But one university administrator pointed out that all lay members of boards of higher education, including the governing board of his institution, have to rely heavily on central staff. This is a problem facing all boards, whether they are governing or coordinating. Whatever the quality of their contribution, there is considerable participation by lay personnel in decision-making affecting higher education in this state. Lay representation exists not only in the coordinating agency, but also in all institutional governing boards.

State Government Influence. The coordinating agency is alleged to have become a tool of the Governor, and its chief executive to have become the "Governor's Boy", in recent years. However, the close relationship between the Governor's office and the agency chief executive is nothing new. It has existed in earlier administrations as well. What is new is the fact that the closeness between the present Governor and the coordinating agency's chief executive is not an outgrowth of their official relations since the two took office. In fact, relatively long-standing political and personal relations between the two are said to have been responsible for the Governor's appointment of the present agency chief executive to that position.

For the first time in some 30 years, issues of higher education are being voted on in a partisan manner in the legislature. This is said to be a product of many things. It results especially from the political and highly controversial role recently played by the coordinating agency. It also stems from higher education's loss of its privileged status, and the fact that spokesmen for higher education now have to compete on a roughly equal (sometimes inferior) footing with other interests for relatively scarce tax dollars.

Span of Control. Neither the coordinating agency nor its staff has the kind of detailed information necessary to make intelligent decisions on specific issues relating to the entire range of programs in the state's public institutions of higher education. Yet, the agency has accepted as one of its major objectives the elimination of needless program duplication. This necessitates recommendations regarding specific programs, and thus requires detailed knowledge about institutional programs. In the absence of such knowledge, the coordinating agency has followed the expedient of using arbitrary cost formulas to support its conclusions pertaining to program duplication and program elimination or change. The bases for many such agency recommendations are widely viewed as being unsound, a judgment with which the agency and its chief executive are reported to concur.

Costs of Bureaucracy. There are occasional references to the expenditures for salaries and operations of the coordinating agency, but this doesn't appear to be a major concern. In addition to the chief executive, the agency staff includes some 30 professionals. Salary and operating costs for the coordinating activities of the agency amount to approximately four-tenths of one percent of the total state allocations to higher education. In addition, each of the institutional boards has a relatively large staff. Much of their activity is related to liaison with and preparation of materials for the coordinating agency.

Processes for Bureaucracy. University administrators complain about the amount of staff time it takes to supply the coordinating agency with cost and operating data. Most of the complaints are not about the red tape per se, but about the "meaninglessness" of so much of the data they are required to compile for the coordinating agency.

Responsiveness. Judgments as to the responsiveness of the higher education system of this state vary sharply according to one's definition of "responsiveness". If one defines educational objectives in terms of serving needs other than those embraced within the traditional concepts of university functions, then the coordinating agency is apt to be seen as an agency that is especially responsive. If the traditional university with its heavy emphasis on research and graduate edu-

cation is accepted as the model, then the coordinating agency is viewed as unresponsive to the "true" needs, with its efforts leading to a leveling and lowering of the quality of higher education.

Agency Staffing. The coordinating agency staff is capable; staff members are generally young and competent. The staff is deemed capable of high quality work. However, several university administrators criticized the objectives toward which the staff work was directed, saying there was frequently intentional distortion to achieve some purpose of the agency, its chief executive, or its staff. Thus, coordinating agency staff analysis is said frequently to be designed to reach preconceived ends; thus analysis becomes subservient to ends adopted for overall strategic, policy, or political reasons.

C-3

State C-3 coordinating agency, with constitutional status and regulatory powers, has been in existence over 30 years. Members of the agency are appointed by the Governor, with Senate consent, for nine-year terms. The agency is responsible for all tax supported institutions of higher education, including the community colleges.

In addition to the central coordinating agency, there are governing boards for individual institutions and for multiple institution systems. The agency has specific power and authority with respect to a number of areas of institutional operations. In other areas it has recommendatory responsibility. The private institutions of higher education are included in the coordinating charge to the agency.

Program Control. The coordinating agency has the necessary legal authority for effective program control. It has authority to determine functions and courses of study in each of the institutions, prescribe educational standards, grant degrees, allocate certain funds, and rule on expansion of physical facilities. There is no record of elimination of degree programs; however, controls have been exercised over the introduction of new programs. The recent naming of a third state university was cited as a failure in program control. The missions of the various institutions are fairly clear.

Resource Allocation. The legislature appropriates a lump sum amount to the coordinating agency and the agency allocates to institutions. Several coordinating agency studies completed during the 1960s have provided the basis for institutional allocations. Legislative interference seems to be minimal. All interviewees supported the lump sum appropriation process; but staff of the university objected to "rigidity and lack of understanding" by the coordinating agency staff with regard to institutional funding.

Long-Range Planning. The agency has a productive record in this area. Eight studies were completed during the 1960s. Conferences and other important methods for disseminating findings have been used. The state has a role and scope statement for higher education for the 1970s based on objective data and study. Legislators are positive about this work and seem to be very aware of the content of the reports. Coordinating agency decisions appear to be guided by the reports. Broader based involvement of persons outside of the central staff in long-range planning appears to be minimal. One coordinating agency staff member acknowledged that this was a serious shortcoming. This may account for some institutional resistance to the plans.

Assignment of Responsibility. Responsibilities of the coordinating agency and governing boards are clearly articulated in writing. In practice, the roles are difficult to keep separated. "Creeping governance" by the coordinating agency was an objection voiced by certain University personnel. There is conflict between the University governing board and the coordinating agency concerning their roles. The coordinating agency staff would like to create a governing board for each institution, which obviously would break up the power of the strong multi-institution governing boards.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. All facets (public universities, state colleges, junior colleges, and private institutions) of higher education in the state are within the purview of the coordinating agency. The private sector and community colleges seem satisfied with the present situation. There seems to be an emphasis on junior colleges and urban concerns. University personnel feel neglected and somewhat under-represented at the coordinating agency level.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. The input of institutional members at the coordinating agency level is reported to be minimal. University representatives feel that the governing role is being infringed upon by the coordinating agency and its staff. They seem to feel "blocked" by a lack of understanding and responsiveness by the coordinating agency staff. Other institutional representatives did not report that concern. "Felt autonomy" was minimal except in the private colleges.

Lay Representation. There is a high degree of lay representation, being present at both coordination agency and governing board levels. The membership of all these bodies is exclusively lay in nature.

State Government Influence. The coordinating agency possesses constitutional status. However, there are indications that state government influence is more than nominal. There are at least two reasons for this conclusion. The previously cited naming of a third university is a case in point. Moreover, the coordinating agency staff is housed in the state capital, providing ready access and contact for legislators and other officials of state government.

Span of Control. There were mixed reactions to the span of control issue, depending upon the role of the interviewee. A legislator, on the one hand, believed that the board had failed to exercise its full legal powers. On the other hand, a representative of the coordinating agency staff believed that the agency was functioning within reasonable limits. Finally, institutional spokesmen reflected the view that the board was "governing rather than coordinating." The number and diversity of institutions inherently pose span of control problems for the coordinating agency.

Costs of Bureaucracy. Observation indicated less than 10 professionals comprise the coordinating agency staff. It was not possible to determine the total number of staff nor the total budget for the agency. These data were not public information and, interestingly enough, financing is provided through a system of institutional assessment, rather than by specific designation by the legislature.

Processes of Bureaucracy. University personnel reported costly delays and frustrations due to bureaucratic

dysfunctions at the coordinating agency level. Response lag and inappropriate feedback to inquiries adversely affected morale and led to suspicions of lack of understanding by the coordinating agency staff for the role of the University. Representatives of other institutions felt that they were being well served.

Responsiveness. With minimal input from institutional representatives to the coordinating agency, lack of understanding of institutional problems, and inadequate communication, there are serious questions as to the adequacy of responsiveness of the agency. This view was primarily advanced by University spokesmen and is not necessarily shared by those associated with the other educational entities.

Agency Staffing. The coordinating agency's chief administrator had served at one time as a legislator and later as a junior college president. He is politically sensitive and works well with legislators. While the staff appears well qualified, they are not perceived by University officials as having appropriate backgrounds for the responsibilities they assume. This perception is not shared by all institutions. The chief administrator seems reluctant to delegate and probably fails to exploit the potential of his junior staff.

D-1

The consolidated governing board in State D-1 has existed in its present form for approximately a decade. The board's nine lay members are appointed for staggered nine-year terms by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the state cabinet and the Senate. Authority of the board extends to all matters affecting the educational programs offered by the state university system, but the board's decisions are subject to the review and authority of the state cabinet. Although the cabinet's role is largely proforma, there has been no clear-cut distinction between the types of decisions that will be reviewed by it and those that will be left to the board. Cabinet instructions into the actual governance of the university system appear to have been rare.

The principal executive officer of the system is appointed by the consolidated governing board. He and his staff, subject to board approval, have

responsibility for: developing policies, rules, and regulations; formulating budget; approving programs of instruction; setting standards of admission; conducting studies of each institution to determine the effectiveness of resource utilization; undertaking space utilization surveys; conducting studies of future needs of the state in higher education; and coordinating all public university programs of higher education.

There are no separate institutional boards. Each university is headed by an executive officer, appointed by the consolidated governing board, upon recommendations made by the system's chief executive.

Program Control. Program control has been exercised primarily with respect to the establishment of new academic programs. The most notable example is a recent "moratorium" on new Ph.D. programs, with the requirement that each proposal for a new doctoral program be accompanied by a plan for phasing out a lesser-priority Ph.D. program. All new programs must be approved by the board. There does not appear to be very effective control over the establishment of new institutions, and there is virtually no review of existing programs.

Lack of effective program control is attributed to divisiveness in the board, and to its having given priority to administrative detail and politically volatile issues, rather than to important educational policy questions. Thus, heightened criticism of the state's universities has followed board decisions on issues such as dormitory visitation and board action in dismissing faculty members considered to have been "agitators."

With recent changes in membership, the board is said to have begun giving much greater emphasis to broad policy matters. However, there is considerable disagreement whether the approach taken can lead to effective program control.

Much of this controversy results from the board's preference for achieving program control indirectly, through formulas for the allocation of resources. Critics contend this approach has not had the intended results, primarily because formula budgeting has controlled allocations by level of program, when it is the type of program that constitutes the critical variable. Budgeting formulas

are said to have been so general that it is virtually impossible to ascertain exactly what they mean when applied at the level of program operations. As an example, the same formula is said to be applied to programs in which there is mass instruction and to programs where there is individualized instruction, such as music and art. In the eyes of other critics, the board's preoccupation with budgeting precludes its attention to the major issues of higher education.

A further example of the board's failure to deal effectively with program control is the establishment of new programs in fields already covered by existing institutions, or in fields where there would be no demand for the professionals to be trained in the program.

Other educators contend that the board has acquiesced in the creation of new state universities. New campuses have been established in response to the desires of individual board members to secure new institutions for their areas of the state, and in response to the pressures exerted by politicians, businessmen, and legislators. Occasionally such influences are said to have resulted in the establishment of institutions in places that are inappropriate measured by levels of student demand, ease of access for commuting students, suitability as a residential college site, or the capacity of already existing institutions to meet these needs.

Undoubtedly, the most effective program control in the system has been that exercised by campus level administrators. Each of the chief executives of the state universities guards jealously the interests of his own institution. Through this means, they have been able until very recently to resist effective central review on most questions.

Resource Allocation. Other board policies are said to have created a resource allocation process that bears little relation to the furtherance of defined missions and objectives for specific institutions. Again at issue is the utilization of formula budgeting. Spokesmen for the board defend this approach, saying that the pattern of allocations can be shifted as needs and circumstances change. Outside the board there is widespread criticism of the superficiality and inflexibility of the formulas used to control resource allocation. Some observers feel that

these criticisms may already be forcing the board and its staff to discontinue use of the more simplistic of these formulas, and to begin actual use of the program review and program budgeting that the board has adopted in name if not in fact.

One other feature of the board's modus operandi is also said to militate against a rational process of resource allocation, according to institutional program needs. Chief administrators of each of the state universities typically have lobbied members of the governing board, thus sabotaging efforts of the chief executive officer to achieve a systematic, comprehensive schema for allocating resources to the different universities. Through a process of logrolling among themselves, the campus administrators hope to capture control of the board, especially toward the end of nullifying the centralizing effect that could be exerted by the chief administrator of the entire system.

Long-Range Planning. The board recently has issued a new long-range plan defining the mission of each of the state's four-year public universities. But the plan lacks credibility in the eyes of much of the university community. Some contend that the plan is too vague. Others argue that the plan does not mean very much because it will not (or cannot) be implemented. Still others feel that there is no real agreement on what should be the future shape of higher education in the state.

The chief uncertainty revolves around the issue of whether all universities in the state system are expected eventually to become equal, comprehensive institutions of higher education, or whether special status as graduate institutions is to be reserved for the older, established universities. Some observers detect what they deem to be an outright contradiction on this point, with the long-range plan stating explicitly that the oldest universities are to be maintained as the system's centers of excellence in graduate education and research. The opposite conclusion is implicit within data on student enrollment projections, and also is implied in the board's specific decisions affecting programs and resource allocations.

Assignment of Responsibility. There has been no clear delineation between the responsibilities of the central governing board and those of the separate campus administration. For most

of its existence, the board has spent most of its time dealing with matters more properly regarded as internal administrative matters that should have been handled by the chief administrators of each of the universities. A study conducted by a committee of the state legislature revealed that even board members realized that less than two percent of the items appearing on agenda for board meetings could be considered significant policy matters. Even when the board has dealt with policy matters of any consequence, they have done so obliquely, through the adoption of what are ostensibly administrative rules or budgeting formulas.

In response to recent public criticisms, the board is now said to be shifting its attention from detailed and often trivial matters of administration to broader policy considerations. Toward that end the board recently reorganized itself and directed its staff to review all operating procedures of the board and the universities over which it has control, to decentralize many operations, and to take detailed operating controls out of the board's hands.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. No single agency exists that has responsibility for coordination of the entire field of higher education. The consolidated governing board has responsibility for the state universities. What little coordination there is, with respect to junior and community colleges, occurs in the state department of education. Needs and functions of the state's private colleges, as they relate to the role of the public institutions, are not considered explicitly anywhere.

The only place where overall coordination could occur is at the level of the state legislature or the state "cabinet." Such coordination has rarely occurred at either place, although the state legislature has recently begun to pay attention to broad policy questions relating to higher education.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. On most of the important questions affecting the universities, the separate campuses have had a large degree of autonomy. These institutions have successfully resisted most efforts to coordinate higher education. Campus administrators have been able to sabotage efforts of the system's chief executive to secure coordination, by lobbying with members of the board and members of the legislature.

Yet, efforts to achieve coordination have introduced rigidities into the system. The most effective instrument has been the university budgeting process. The budget formulas impose constraints upon resource utilization at the campus level. The campuses feel a loss of autonomy, because they no longer have discretion to spend their funds in whatever manner they see fit.

Lay Representation. As is true of all systems utilizing a consolidated governing board, a very small proportion of this state's citizenry ever becomes directly involved in the governance of higher education. However the relative few appointed to the board have come from many areas of the state and from both major political parties. Women, Blacks, and other groups have been under-represented over the years. Overall, lay participation would appear to have added relatively little to decisions on important matters of educational policy. On technical issues, board members have deferred either to the views of the university administrators or to the views of the system's chief executive and his staff. But on other kinds of issues - dormitory intervisitation, campus demonstrations, "militancy" and "radicalism" among the faculty, and campus speakers policy--board member have exercised a strong and independent influence.

State Government Influence. Political influences emanating from the executive branch and the state legislature have affected many types of decisions in the area of higher education. Decisions to establish new campuses of the state university system have been the direct consequences of legislative actions; on several occasions, decisions to establish new campuses have been made without any consideration being given to the question by the consolidated governing board. This is generally deemed to have led to an overexpansion of the university system and to the choice of some campus locations solely on the basis of patronage or "political" considerations, rather than on the basis of criteria pertaining to sound educational policy.

Both the executive and legislative branches have become involved in recent efforts to reorganize higher education. The Governor's interests appear to have been motivated by two desires: to improve the mechanism for achieving coordination in higher education; and to use higher education as the beginning point in an effort to

reorganize the structure of the executive branch. Some legislators share both these concerns, while other legislators seek reorganization of higher education in an effort to prevent the recurrence of recent "radical" events on the university campuses.

Span of Control. By choosing to concentrate on administrative matters, rather than major policy questions, the board has placed itself in a most difficult position. Board members have not been able to make informed decisions on the wide and detailed variety of administrative matters that arise in a large multi-university system.

The emphasis upon administrative detail, rather than policy, has been accompanied by a conservative decision-making process, in which there is hesitance about delegation of authority or decentralizing power. For much of its existence, the system appears to have been characterized by a mentality which decreed that the only way to handle things was to establish a uniform rule or procedure.

As noted earlier, the board has recently announced its intention to concentrate more on policy matters, allowing the separate institutions to deal with administrative matters.

Costs of Bureaucracy. Salaries and wages for consolidated governing board staff activities having to do with governance of higher education amount to about seven-tenths of one percent of the total system budget.

Processes of Bureaucracy. Most problems growing out of bureaucratic slowness and inefficiency have been concentrated in the purchasing and personnel areas. Occasional problems are said to have been encountered in securing approval for new academic programs because of the insistence of system administrators on uniformity.

Responsiveness. There has been uneven performance in the university system's capacity to respond to new needs. Many legislators express disappointment with the system. They contend that only through creation of a more effective decision-making process will higher education come to recognize and serve the real needs of the people in the state.

There is mixed reaction as to the role of the board and its staff. Some contend that this group is the only element in the system of higher education that is very responsive, since the faculty and administrators of the

campuses are conservative and wedded to the status quo. Others agree that the board and its chief executive have been responsive, but to influences that are damaging to the interests of higher education. More specifically, it is charged that the board's staff is responding to political influences and that its decisions with respect to the allocation of resources are designed to curry favor with the state's metropolitan areas, largely with an eye toward securing greater legislative support for higher education.

Agency Staffing. Staff assigned to the central governing board appear to be of above average quality. The chief executive is widely considered to be highly competent, as are those members of his staff who handle program budgeting. Administrators associated with specific campuses assert that the campus support staff is of appreciably better quality than staff assigned to the central coordinating or governing board.

D-2

This state has had a constitutionally-provided consolidated governing board for over 40 years. The board is composed of 15 members appointed by the Governor, subject to Senate approval. Board members serve staggered seven-year terms. The Governor serves a four-year term and cannot succeed himself. The chief administrator of the state's system of higher education is chosen by the board. The by-laws of the board stipulate that only this chief administrator may bring business before the board, and that he is the sole spokesman for the board.

The consolidated governing board is responsible for the University of State D-2, for more than a dozen state colleges, and for a similar number of junior colleges. It has full governing powers for all of these institutions, including the rights to consolidate, merge, or discontinue institutions or programs. All monies are channeled through the board, and state appropriations are allocated by it.

Program Control. The consolidated governing board is authorized to establish institutions of higher education, to consolidate, suspend, and discontinue institutions, to merge departments, to add or discontinue courses, and add or discontinue degree programs.

In other words, it is empowered to exercise complete program control. Proposals for new degree programs have been disapproved, but no existing programs have been terminated, at least within the last five years. Institutional missions are designated and academic requirements and course offerings are highly standardized through the public institutions of higher education.

Institutional respondents noted that program innovation is difficult, since all program changes have to be approved by the board. In some instances, it has taken as long as two years for proposed course additions to be approved.

Resource Allocation. The board exercises complete control over resource allocation. Each institution prepares and submits budget requests, but the legislature appropriates a lump sum to the board. The chief administrator and the board mutually allocate funds to the institutions from the lump sum amount. Several of the individuals interviewed reported that the larger, established institutions, and those with more aggressive leadership, has an advantage in the budgeting process. However, there was considerable agreement that under the consolidated governing board, overt competition among the institutions for fiscal support was virtually nonexistent.

Long-Range Planning. A comprehensive long-range plan for public higher education has been developed. Under the plan, the units in the system have been assigned missions with designated areas of concentration, for example, undergraduate education, graduate education, and the sciences. The long-range planning activities of the board appear to be highly centralized in the offices of the chief administrator and of his immediate staff with minimal influence from individual institutions.

Assignment of Responsibility. The consolidated governing board very clearly has complete responsibility for the state's system of public higher education.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. The board's purview extends to the public community colleges, four-year colleges, and universities. Private and vocational institutions and their programs do not, however, fall within its jurisdiction.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. The autonomy of individual institutions is quite limited. The governing board has established uniform policies for all institutions in a broad array of areas. Major policies are apparently established by the chief administrator and approved by the board; individual institutions have a limited involvement in the process. Not only is the chief administrator the sole source of business for the board and its sole spokesman, but he also prepares the agenda for each board meeting. Institutional chief administrators comprise an advisory council to the chief administrator of the board, but by statute this advisory council is required to meet only three times per year. There was some evidence in the interviews that these meetings serve principally as a forum for the chief administrator of the system to communicate information to the institutional chief administrators.

Lay Representation. Lay representation in the governance of higher education is limited to the 15 members of the consolidated board. The prevailing opinion, furthermore, is that the staff of the board wields much influence, and that the board defers to the advice of the chief administrator and his staff on most issues. While the board must include representatives from each congressional district in the state, certain respondents suggested that the board was not completely free of partisanship, and that certain geographical areas of the state and minority groups were not adequately represented on the board.

State Government Influence. Some respondents reported that state government did influence the deliberations of the governing board. However, because the terms of office of board members exceed the term of any single Governor, the likelihood of the board being composed of a significant number of politically-favored individuals is diminished.

Span of Control. The types of institutions for which the governing board is responsible is quite diverse, and several of the respondents suggested that the number of institutions for which the board is responsible is so large that the situation is almost unmanageable. Some of those interviewed questioned the adequacy of the background of the board and of its staff for the responsibilities assigned to them. Problems of appropriate con-

trol are compounded by the tendency of the board to involve itself in operational matters of the individual institutions.

Costs of Bureaucracy. Although specific data on the budget of the consolidated governing board was not obtained, it was apparent that the cost of the board and its staff is high. The staff and the physical facilities it occupies are large.

Processes of Bureaucracy. The large number of institutions in the system and the range of responsibilities of the board requires an extensive bureaucracy at the board level. Even faculty members who were interviewed commented on the amount of paper work required and the number of channels through which it flows. Although delays, brought about by these factors, were reported not to be uncommon, few real problems were cited in the processing of routing financial, business, and personnel transactions under the regulations of the board.

Responsiveness. The consolidated governing board and the institutions it controls evidently have little ability to make timely responses to new needs or special problems. This problem appeared to be particularly acute in the case of the smaller institutions, which possess less administrative acumen than the larger ones. The "distance" of institutional faculties from the point at which decisions are made renders their abilities to serve as agents of change relatively ineffective.

Agency Staffing. Although the salary levels of the board's staff positions are generally attractive, there has been difficulty in filling these positions with suitably qualified individuals. This has been the case despite the appreciable responsibility and authority that, at least nominally, accompanies staff positions. The strength of the incumbent chief administrator, who apparently exercises the responsibilities assigned to him and his staff, may act to diminish the attractiveness of staff positions to highly qualified individuals.

D-3

The consolidated governing board in State D-3 was created quite recently as a result of a specially called session of the General Assembly. The

General Assembly convened in its first adjourned session in more than a century and adopted extensive changes in the structure in governance of higher education. For more than a decade there has been bitter and chaotic competition for appropriations between the multi-campus university system and the state's expanding regional colleges. More than 20 years ago there was formed a board of higher education in State D-3, which was intended to plan and coordinate the growth of higher education and bring balance to the aspirations of the multi-campus university and the regionals. However, the board's power over such key matters as budget and new degree programs was so limited that it was unable to control the competition.

Almost 10 years ago the legislature made another attempt to dampen the competition for graduate programs by writing in the statute books the function of each campus. This plan apparently failed, and as late as three years ago, there were at least 15 separately supported universities having legal authority to offer doctorates.

The present 32 members who will comprise the consolidated governing board are functioning as a planning committee and will continue to do so until July 1, 1972. By this date, the planning committee will have developed a plan for merging the staff positions of the board of higher education and the general administration of the University of State D-3, and made arrangements for housing this staff and the consolidated governing board. At the present time, it would appear that the site and the majority of the staff for the consolidated governing board have been selected. The board is statutorily responsible for 16 institutions in the state. This includes responsibilities to (a) review and approve institutional plans; (b) review programs with authority to approve or deny proposed new degree programs and academic organization units; (c) appoint and fix compensation of institutional administrative personnel and persons having permanent tenure; (d) approve the establishment of any new publicly supported institutions above the community college level; (e) set tuition and required fees; (f) set enrollment levels of institutions; (g) prepare and present to the Governor, advisory budget commission, and the General Assembly a single, unified, recommended budget

for all public senior higher education; (h) prescribe uniform physical and other reporting forms and procedures; (i) administer state-wide federal or state programs that provide aid to institutions for students of post-secondary education, except those related to the community college system; and, (j) collect and disseminate data concerning higher education in the state, which includes working cooperatively with the community colleges and private colleges and universities in the state. While the private colleges and universities do not come within the purview of the board, it is charged with assessing the contributions and needs of the private colleges and universities and giving advice and recommendations to the General Assembly to the end that the resources of these institutions are utilized in the best interests of the state. In addition to the new consolidated board, each public four-year institution will be served by its own lay board, but the institutional boards will have only advisory roles.

Program Control. The consolidated governing board has been designated to determine functions, educational activities, and academic programs of 16 publicly supported higher education institutions in the state. It may determine the types of degrees to be awarded. The board, after adequate notice and after affording the institutional board an opportunity to be heard, has authority to withdraw approval of any existing program if it appears that the program is unproductive, excessively costly, or unnecessarily duplicative. The effectiveness of the program control that is exerted by the board will be tested in the very near future, as one institution is proceeding with the development of an expensive professional school that has been considered by many people in the state as inappropriate. The extensive offering of doctoral degrees throughout the state is another problem that the board will face. Institutional missions have not been well defined in the past, and this is an item that will be given consideration by the board. The board has the power to approve the establishment of any new publicly supported institution above the community college level, and establish tuition and fee rates and enrollment levels.

Resource Allocation and Use. The board will develop and present to the Governor, the advisory budget commission

and the General Assembly a single recommended budget. Funds for the continuing operation of each institution will be appropriated directly to the institution. Funds for salary increases for employees are to be appropriated to the board in a lump sum for allocation to the institutions. The advisory budget commission may, on recommendations of the board, authorize transfer of appropriated funds from one institution to another to provide adjustments for over - under enrollment, or may make any other adjustments among institutions that would provide for efficient operation of the institution. There will be considerable input required from the institutions for budget procedures; however, there will be considerable influence from state government regarding the form of budget request forms and analysis undertaken. Emphasis is expected to be placed upon formulae in budget analysis.

Long-Range Planning. Long-range planning, other than through general designations of campus missions, is currently lacking. The lack of long-range planning may have contributed to the long history of conflict between the University and regional colleges.

Assignment of Responsibility. The legislature has a long history of becoming involved in matters of administration in higher education. Even with the newly established board, evidence was found that an appropriate differentiation between responsibilities for broad policy establishment and management with policy guidelines may still not be recognized.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. The board is responsible for governing 16 institutions in the state. These include the universities and the state colleges. The community colleges and the private colleges and universities in the state are not included in the governing powers of the board. However, the board is charged with periodically revising a long-range plan for a coordinated system of higher education in the state, and in such preparations the private colleges and universities are to be considered. State-wide federal and state programs that provide aid to institutions or students of post-secondary education throughout the state are administered by the board.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. It is felt that the newly-created board will act to end more than a decade of chaotic competition for pro-

grams and appropriations between the multi-campus university and the state's ambitious, expanding state colleges. Where formerly there existed extensive institutional autonomy, with the recently-adopted administrative organizational pattern, the campus administrators appear to have limited authority. The locus of power is with the board. It is felt that there is a need for more expertise from the institutional representatives. The faculty appears to have little concern for the new type of governance as they are quite removed from the center of power. It will be difficult to bring individual institutional considerations to bear on state-level decision making. It is felt that the larger established institutions still have an advantage over the "have-nots." The matter of quality of students and faculty in all institutions is given little or no consideration. As a result, this has some leveling effects and it is felt that this may eventually lead to an erosion of quality in some of the state institutions that have in the past enjoyed a national reputation.

Lay Representation. The board is composed of members of the lay public designated by the Governor. There are 32 voting members who comprise the board, with 16 from State D-3 university system and 16 from State D-3 regional colleges. To phase out the previously active State Board of Higher Education, two members have been designated members of the board without voting rights. As the terms of members of the governing board expire, their successors will be elected by the Senate and House of Representatives. Eight members will be elected every two years, and all terms will commence on July 1 of odd number years, with all members serving eight-year overlapping full terms. No member may be elected to more than two full terms in succession. Of the eight elected every two years, at least one will be a woman and at least one member shall be from the political party to which the largest minority of the members of the General Assembly belong. No member may be an employee of the state or of any institution of higher education governed by the board. Present representation is diverse and guidelines for future representation provide for bipartisanship, geographical and minority group considerations.

State Government Influence. Political influence has been heavily felt in the development of higher education in

the past. This is a primary reason that a consolidated governing board has been developed for higher education in this state. Considerable state government influence is felt in the matter of budgeting. This influence is accepted and a strong effort is being made to develop good relations between the legislators and higher education. Coincidentally, the chief administrative officer for the Governor is a respected professor from the state university system. It would appear that this assignment will be helpful to both higher education and state government. There appears to be respect and understanding between these two groups on budgetary matters.

Span of Control. It is generally felt that the consolidated governing board has and will continue to have inadequate understanding of the individual operating units, because of the diversity and sheer numbers involved in the 16 institutions of higher education. There was concern for the adequateness of the background preparation of some members of the board and staff for the responsibility being assumed. However, with the background and proven competency of major administrative staff members, it was very clear that there was more expertise presently functioning than there has been for some time when the executive or legislative branches of state government controlled many matters relating to higher education.

Costs of Bureaucracy. Economies are not realized from the consolidated governing type of administration. It has become necessary to combine two administrative staffs from the University system (45) and the Board of Education (25). Approximately three newly created top level administrative positions will be created to accommodate this merger. Facilities to house staff are controversial. The building that is at least temporarily designated represents a capital outlay of approximately \$1,285,000 and encompasses about 38,680 square feet of space. The current budget for this combined group amounts of \$1,035,712, excluding the staff for organized research and educational television.

Processes of Bureaucracy. All respondents generally agreed that with another administrative level in organization there is increased paper flow and the time for decision-making is significantly increased. The governing

board is felt to be bureaucratic rather than a team process. Faculty morale is somewhat low and there prevails a feeling of being removed from the administration. Purchasing and other campus requests disappear into the system level with limited feedback. The present type of governance is an involuntary arrangement; therefore, it is the opinion of many in the state that there are built-in problems. Many feel that there is little reason to believe that this newly-designated type of governance will function better than the old type of governance; concluding, any type of organizational structure is only as good as the people involved.

Responsiveness. Previous agency coordination has demonstrated that extreme responsiveness to institutional requests has resulted in excessive program duplication and competition for funds. With the newly-established board, there appears to be limited responsiveness to new needs and requirements, as well as quite inflexible operating procedures that involve high value purchases.

Agency Staffing. The nature of responsibilities of the governing board and the reputations of selected staff members permits the attraction of highly qualified staff. Many highly qualified staff members were interviewed. However, some evidence was found of inheritance of staff members because of length of service or for political affiliations. It may be concluded that some governing board professional staff members are less well qualified than middle management staff at some of the senior member institutions. It appears that because of political affiliations some staff members are being employed at very attractive salaries, and some of the positions that are being offered are not well described.

D-4

State D-4 is one having many years of experience with a consolidated governing board. The board, appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate, consists of nine public members serving terms of six years each. The original objectives of the board were to: prevent undesirable duplication, secure more effective utilization of

public monies, and terminate as well as prevent future inter-institutional rivalries. The board was given authority to formulate policy in respect to curricula, admissions, tuition, staffing, finances, building, and planning for the several state supported four-year institutions.

A full-time staff, headed by a Chancellor, was simultaneously authorized to administer the system. The Chancellor was designated as the official liaison between the legislature and the state system of higher education. There was no provision at that time for coordination with public junior colleges or with private institutions; nor, has there been any legislation to bring the relatively recently-established community colleges within the purview of the board and its Chancellor.

A few years ago the state legislature created an additional coordinating agency with the objective of providing joint, voluntary planning by the board, the Governor's office, and the State Board of Education. More specifically, this supra-coordinating body was charged with responsibilities for: advising the various governing bodies of education institutions, preparation and submission of plans for participating in federal government assistance programs, and conduct of educational studies initiated by the agency or requested by the Governor. The membership of this body includes lay representatives, college and university presidents, a representative from the public school sector, as well as one member from each of the legislative educational committees in the Senate and House.

Program Control. Program control, is exercised largely over new programs, especially those at the graduate level. There has been definition of campus roles providing rather clear jurisdictional boundary lines. While in one case a new campus was begun and rapidly and broadly developed, largely due to political considerations, by and large control has been quite effective. Little has been done in review and modification of existing programs. This is now taking place on each campus, under the direction of the president, because of budget cuts throughout the system.

Resource Allocation. Resource allocation is accomplished primarily

through headcount formulas and lump sum allocations to each campus from the total appropriation to the board. It is questionable whether such formula procedures adequately recognize differences in institutional missions and programs. One respondent noted that "such an approach has the inherent danger of mindless uniformity."

Institutional presidents are relatively free to apportion the lump sum within individual campuses.

Long-Range Planning. Long-range planning, other than through definition of campus roles, is lacking. No master plan exists. The Chancellor believes strongly in decentralization and depends on the campuses for innovation and program development. The board does not originate new programs. Moreover, the community colleges are not within the purview of the board. There are real possibilities of stronger long-range planning as the role of the supra-coordinating agency is expanded.

Assignment of Responsibility. Responsibility is shared among the governing board, its staff, and institutional presidents, with the former responsible for fund acquisition and the latter for budget and program recommendations. A third agency is making its presence known; the supra-agency is beginning to assume responsibility.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. Exclusion of the public junior and community colleges does limit comprehensiveness of purview. While the private sector is also excluded, that is not serious because the private institutions are limited in number, are small, and are almost exclusively undergraduate, liberal arts oriented. Some years ago, the governing board was asked to take the community colleges under its wing. It declined, stating that such a move would spread the board too thinly and enlarge its span of control beyond effective limits. Vocational school programs are within the board's purview. While the role of the supra-coordinating agency is essentially based on voluntary cooperation of public and private institutions, including junior and community colleges, there is evidence that this agency's purview might be expanded to include all education from kindergarten through graduate and professional levels.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. Each institution's autonomy and influence are limited in varying degrees by (a) campus role definitions, (b) headcount formula for fund allocations, (c) political considerations leading governing board to stay on even keel with all state institutions, which has led to some leveling effects and erosion of quality, and (d) policy that only the board, Chancellor, and designated members of his staff are permitted to take the platform on issues of state supported education before the legislature and general public. On the other hand, institutional autonomy and influence are fostered by: (a) the board's policy of not taking the initiative for program change or innovation and the Chancellor's philosophy of decentralization, (b) lump sum allocations to campuses, and (c) dependence on campuses for initiating new programs and changing emphasis among existing programs. Inter-institutional rivalry has been all but eliminated on the public scene. Whatever competition that does exist among institutions is kept "in-house."

Lay Representation. With two exceptions, the general feeling was that the board met the criterion of lay representation. One point of exception concerned the preponderance of representatives on the nine-member board residing in the state's largest city, and showing preferences, at least during the inception and development, to the state institution located in that city. Other than this it was believed that the board, consisting of four attorneys, two businessmen, a civil servant, a former Governor, and a housewife, had performed its role in a statesmanlike manner. The second exception is that lay participation is limited to the members of the single consolidated governing board and supra-coordinating agency. While the board relied on its staff for informational input and recommendations, there was no indication of "rubber stamp" activities.

State Government Influence. To a large degree, the integrity of higher education has been maintained, and respondents agreed that they could not recall any situation in which an educational issue had resulted in a partisan split in the legislature. More than one respondent did feel, however, that political influence did dominate in the establishment and development of the state institution in the largest city.

In recent years, political influence seems to be growing, with the legislature taking an active part in determining new building priorities among the campuses, in student affairs, as well as in issues of faculty tenure. Furthermore, the strengthened role of the supra-agency suggests a possible breakdown in the confidence of the legislature in the consolidated board.

Span of Control. With less than 10 institutions under the board's purview, no span of control problem was indicated. The board, for the most part, had stayed with policy matters, deferring to the institutions for operating management. Having been in existence for many years, the board has exercised its ample opportunity to become acquainted with the individual characteristics and problems of each institution.

Cost of Bureaucracy. Approximately 200 professional, administrative, and clerical personnel are employed full-time and part-time by the governing board. Wages and salaries represent about 2.5 percent of the operating budget for the system and its member institutions. Some of the work done by this group would have to be done if it were not in existence, but several interviewees asked, "Do the returns justify the outlay?"

Processes of Bureaucracy. All respondents agreed that another administrative level in the organization adds paper work and time in the decision-making process. Several at the campus level felt that the board and its staff caused excessive paper flow and an over-standardization of procedures. They also commented that campus requests disappeared into the system with no feedback until formal announcement. It was believed that bureaucracy destroys effective communication.

One institutional respondent posed a fundamental question, "What do you centralize, and what do you decentralize?" For example, should there be uniform policies for student services and dormitories? There has even been a proposal to centralize the student records of all campuses at the state capital.

Responsiveness. Communication and feedback, as previously stated, could be improved considerably vis à vis board to institution. Likewise, it was believed by campus respondents that there should be more informal and timely response from the board. The ability of each campus to meet new needs, while inhibited by the bureaucratic process and certain inflexible guidelines, was encouraged by the board philosophy of decentralized program innovation and lump sum funding.

Agency Staffing. There was no apparent staffing problem. Salaries were in many cases higher for board administrators than for campus counterparts, and board staff are of obvious competence.

The information assembled from the nine case study states provides the foundation for a discussion of the case study findings in terms of basic structures for state-level coordination and governance. This discussion is presented in the following chapter. Conclusions, with respect to each of the 13 criteria for evaluation, are stated and compared with the postulates developed in Chapter II. The basic hypotheses stated in Chapter II are also considered and a general conclusion offered.

IV

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The following statements draw together the findings from the nine case studies. These findings are discussed in terms of each of the 13 criteria used for evaluation. Conclusions are drawn regarding the degrees to which the three forms of coordination or governance meet the criteria.

Program Control. The program control criterion focuses largely upon the control of academic degree programs. At issue is the existence and rationality at the state level of a procedure for associating degree programs with individual institutions. Such a procedure may include the review of proposals for new programs and the review of existing programs. At issue also is the assignment of institutional roles or missions. Finally, the matter of establishing new institutions of higher education is considered here.

A responsibility for exercising program control, with respect to degree programs, was found in each of the regulatory coordinating agency and consolidated governing board states and in one of the two advisory coordinating agency states visited. However, it must be concluded that the vesting of this responsibility in the central body has not insured effective and rational program control. In at least one case, there is a cumbersome review process for all proposals for new programs, but essentially all such proposals are approved by the central agency. Conceivably, this could be explained by the fact that the proposals submitted to the coordinating agency are uniformly sound, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The review process itself is not very thorough or discriminating. In another case, a long standing responsibility for program control has not been exercised until quite recently. In still another case, there was evidence that the central agency attempts to control program development through its budget recommendation process. While the cost implications of new programs are clearly important ones, such a device is, at best, an indirect ap-

proach to the program control responsibility. In only one of the states visited was there observed any specific activity directed towards the review and possible discontinuance of existing programs, except as this occurs at the institutional level. The approach of the only central agency engaging in this type of activity does not appear to be a sound one.

Institutional roles and missions appeared to be moderately well defined in the three case study states having regulatory coordinating agencies. In at least one of the consolidated governing board states, it had to be concluded that institutional roles and missions were not well defined.

Many new institutions of higher education have been created in recent years. While there were exceptions in the case study states, the evidence suggests that new institutions have been created and located less on the basis of recommendations and advice from the coordinating or governing body, than on the basis of politics and pressures felt in the executive and legislative branches of state government.

There are points of dissatisfaction with the manner in which the program control responsibility is exercised in each of the three categories of states visited. Such dissatisfaction ranges from the level of the institution to that of the state legislature. It may be noted that in one of the two case study states, which had advisory coordinating agencies, the control exercised over new programs appeared to be reasonably effective and to produce a minimum of dissatisfaction. This state of affairs was attributed to the confidence of state government and of the institutions in the coordinating agency.

The conclusion to be drawn from the case study findings with respect to program control is as follows:

The assignment of a responsibility for program control to a state level coordinating

agency, be it advisory or regulatory, or to a consolidated governing board does not insure that the responsibility will be exercised in a rational, efficient, or effective manner.

Resource Allocation. With but one exception, the coordinating agencies and governing boards in the case study states exercise a responsibility in the legislative budget request and allocation process. Indeed, the state-level bodies possessing this responsibility appeared to regard it as their most central charge. In two of the three regulatory coordinating agency states, and in the single advisory coordinating agency state with this responsibility, the pattern is for the coordinating agency to receive budget request documents from its constituent institutions, to perform its own review of these requests, and to forward the institutional requests and the independent recommendations of the agency to state government. In the third regulatory coordinating agency state, and in all four consolidated governing board states, the central body receives, reviews, and revises institutional requests into a single consolidated budget for submission to state government. In these states, the amount appropriated by the legislature typically goes to the central body for allocation among the several institutions.

In several of the regulatory coordinating agency and consolidated governing board states, there were severe criticisms of the procedures used by the central body in exercising its resource allocation responsibility. Some of these criticisms dealt with the volume and detail of data requested by the central body for its budget development activity and with the mechanistic and inappropriate ways by which, often through formulas, these data are converted into budget recommendation or allocation amounts. In other states, the criticism was that the procedures used for analysis were too simplistic. In at least one state, the regulatory coordinating agency was censured because budget recommendations seemed to be designed to manipulate program and other institutional characteristics, and because this was not a proper exercise of the budget recommendation responsibility. Such criticisms, of course, came from the institutions, but it was not uncommon for the coordinating agency or consolidated governing board staff to acknowledge the justness of some of the criticisms.

In the consolidated governing board states, as already indicated, the requests of the individual institutions are reviewed and modified at the board level and a single consolidated request forwarded to state government. Thus, the legislature needs to contend with but a single request from the institutions of higher education under the purview of the consolidated board. In this arrangement, the consolidated board becomes the focal point for the institutions in the budget arena. The board is the spokesman for the institutions in this regard, and competition among the institutions for resources are generally kept "in-house" and not permitted to overflow into the broader public arena. This pattern, of course, does not guarantee an orderly and equitable resource allocation process. Board members can be, and have been, lobbied with as effectively as legislators.

One of the two advisory coordinating agencies does not formally review institutional legislative budget requests. However, this agency has been asked to advise the legislature on funding procedures, and it is possible to speculate that as soon as the coordinating agency provides this advice, it will be asked to implement it. In the second advisory coordinating agency state, there was little evidence of dissatisfaction with the budget review and recommendation processes of the agency, either by representatives of state government or by those of the several institutions.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that:

The type of structure -- advisory coordinating agency, regulatory coordinating agency, or consolidated governing board -- bears little or no relationship to the rationality and acceptability of the process by which state funds are allocated to individual institutions.

Long Range Planning. It is generally agreed that comprehensive long-range plans should provide principles and guidelines that serve as a basis for decision-making, from the level of the individual institution to the level of state government. Instances of potentially influential results in the long-range planning area were found in the three states with regulatory coordina-

ting agencies. Comprehensive long-range planning does occur in one of the two advisory coordinating agency states and to some degree in two of the four consolidated governing board states. Long-range planning appears to be a fundamental responsibility of regulatory coordinating agencies. It is less clear, from the case studies, that this function is inherent in the advisory coordinating arrangement, although it would seem that it should be.

A different situation appears to exist under the consolidated governing board arrangement. Two forces which tend to discourage long-range planning may operate in this arrangement. First, the vast governing responsibility of the board may require so much of the energy of the board and its staff that long-range considerations without immediate implications for action do not reach the agenda. Furthermore, the fact that the board possesses the governing responsibility may cause it to fail to recognize the desirability of or need for long-range principles and guidelines as a basis for the exercise of its governing responsibilities. Perhaps the principles and guidelines are, in this case, more implicit than explicit.

While, as noted above, comprehensive planning does occur within each of the three groups of states under study, it must be noted that the quality of the efforts observed was not uniformly high, even in the three regulatory coordinating agency states in which the activity appeared to be most intense.

The conclusion with regard to the long-range planning criterion is as follows:

Long-range planning of varying quality, and with varying degrees of influence, may occur within any one of the three forms of coordination and governance examined. The effort is likely to be given somewhat more emphasis in states with regulatory coordinating agencies; it is somewhat less likely to occur in states with consolidated governing boards.

Assignment of Responsibility. Responsibility and accountability for the affairs of higher education are most clearly assigned and exercised in states with advisory coordinating agencies. The responsibility and accountability in such states rests with

institutional governing boards. The responsibility assigned the coordinating agency is advisory only, and the effectiveness with which this responsibility is exercised is dependent upon the confidence in which the agency is held by state government and by the institutions.

Responsibility is also clearly defined in those states with consolidated governing boards, at least with regard to the institutions for which the governing board is responsible. In one of the four consolidated governing board states visited, however, it was clear that the governing board had failed to exercise the broad responsibility assigned to it. This board's preoccupation with peripheral matters has, by default, left the consideration of major policy to the institutions in the state. In a second consolidating governing board state, the board has, by design, permitted each institution to deal with major program policy matters within the broad role definition assigned to it.

There are constitutional or statutory provisions, in the three case study states with regulatory coordinating agencies, specifying the responsibilities assigned the agency and those left to the institutional governing boards. The interpretation of these provisions, however, has been equivocal. The roles of the coordinating agency and the institutional governing boards did not appear to be clearly differentiated in practice in these states. Charges from the institutions that the coordinating agency had over-stepped the limits of its assigned responsibilities were common in these states; and members of agency staffs acknowledged that the limits set by law were difficult to interpret in practice.

In many of the states visited, and without regard for the type of structure for coordination and governance in use, there was evidence that the state level body had been unable to deal effectively with major policy matters and fundamental issues in the coordination and governance of higher education. It appeared that hard issues were avoided or postponed, in the interest of maintaining harmony within the coordinating or governing body and with the institutions served.

The following conclusion appears to be warranted:

The assignment and exercise of responsibility and

accountability for higher education, below the level of state government, is most clear in states with advisory coordinating agencies and least clear in states with regulatory coordinating agencies.

Comprehensiveness of Purview. If a state level body is to provide effective coordination of the activities of higher education in a state, the legal purview of the body should include the whole of higher education in the state. In the five case study states with coordinating agencies, advisory or regulatory, the purviews of the agencies are complete. The responsibilities of the agencies in each of these five states extended to public and private, two-year and four-year institutions. The purviews of the consolidated governing boards in the four states with this form of governance were mixed. Two of the consolidated governing boards had no responsibility for public junior colleges, three had no responsibility for private institutions, and in one case the public junior colleges and private institutions were included as only a tangential responsibility of the consolidated governing board.

Consolidated governing boards are, almost by definition, established to control only public institutions of higher education. Thus, comprehensive coordination in the field of higher education, for states with consolidated governing boards, would seem to require a coordinating agency at the state level superimposed upon the consolidated governing board, the boards of control for the private institutions, and any additional segment of public higher education not assigned to the consolidated board. Indeed, in one of the consolidated governing board states visited, such a supra-coordinating agency has been in existence for a number of years. Until very recently, this agency has been relatively inactive in the field of higher education. It is now becoming more prominent by virtue of the breadth of its purview.

The following conclusion appears to be warranted:

The purviews of coordinating agencies, advisory or regulatory, can and usually do extend to all institutions of higher education in the state. The purviews of consolidated governing boards

are more limited and typically extend to all or only a portion of higher education in the public sector.

Institutional Autonomy and Influence. If institutional autonomy is defined as the degree to which an institution and its governing board possess the capacity for self determination, it is clear from the case studies that institutional autonomy is greatest in states which have advisory coordinating agencies. Institutions governed by a consolidated board have less autonomy, while those associated with a regulatory coordinating agency occupy an intermediate position. Yet, the case study evidence indicates that the total range of variation in the extent of actual institutional autonomy is not very great from one type of coordinating structure to another; moreover, there is considerable variation within and overlap among each of the three categories in this regard. A principal factor in this variation appeared to be the philosophy and style of the chief administrator for the coordinating or governing body. A strong and forceful administrator of a coordinating agency can prompt institutional complaints of infringement of autonomy. By the same token, a different style of leadership by a chief administrator of a consolidated governing board will lead to few complaints of this type.

Within several of the coordinating agency states, there were governing boards which were responsible for either several institutions or for several campuses of a single institution. Campus or institutional administrators working under such structures reported that their multi-campus or multi-institution boards also limited the autonomy of their campuses or institutions. While the focus of the case studies was upon the coordinating agency in these states, and not upon the structures for governance that existed below the state level, the existence and functioning of the intermediate governance structures are important factors in the total pattern of coordination and governance for those states in which they exist.

No clear-cut relationship was found in the case studies between type of structure for coordination and governance and mechanisms in use for providing advice and influence from the institutions to the central body. Such mechanisms for institutional advice and influence ranged from very informal to

highly structured, and from quite minimal to very extensive, regardless of the type of structure in use. Similar variations were found in the degree to which advice from the institutions to the central body was allowed to influence the deliberations of the central body.

Several case study interviews revealed that the question of which functions and activities of higher education should be centralized at the state level, and which should be left decentralized, is at present unanswered. In at least two of the case study states, there is an appreciable centralization of higher education computer activities. Presumably, this came about because of the costliness of computers. At least one instance of the centralization of student aid programs was observed, and plans for increased state level coordination of all extension programs was noted. In another state, the possibility of centralizing all student records at the state level has been considered. It is too early to make judgments about the impact and effectiveness of the centralization of activities such as these, but it is clear that the removal of such activities from the complete control of the individual institution does provide a basis for charges of infringement of autonomy. Whether or not such charges are well founded, it is clear that there is no easy answer to the specifics of the centralization versus decentralization question.

The difficulty of this question is compounded by the number and variety of academic and administrative issues and functions in higher education and by the interrelatedness of them. For example, the establishment of standards for admission has important implications for a variety of academic program considerations. This relationship explains why admission policies have traditionally been established at the institutional and even faculty level. At the same time, it is true that admission policies are, in part, related to the mix of enrollments among institutions, and that they may be an issue in state-level coordination.

The conclusion with regard to institutional autonomy and influence may be stated as follows:

Increasing centralization of regulatory authority and governing power, as represented by movement from the advisory coordi-

nating agency structure to the consolidated governing board arrangement, is accompanied by perceptions of declining levels of institutional autonomy, even though there are only modest differences in the actual amount of autonomy possessed by institutions in different types of coordinating structures. The nature and extent of institutional influence upon decision-making of state level bodies is conditioned more by environmental and human factors than by the particular structure for coordination or governance.

Lay Representation. Very clearly the greatest potential for broad lay representation in the conduct of higher education is provided for by the coordinating agency structure. In this structure, the lay public is represented not only at the coordinating agency level, but also at the level of institutional governing boards. The consolidated governing board arrangement limits lay participation to the membership of the single board.

The quality and effectiveness of lay representation is another question. Any coordinating or governing body may defer to the analysis and judgment of its professional staff. Institutional governing boards, state level coordinating agencies, and consolidated boards are equally susceptible to domination by their chief executive officers and professional staffs. The determining factors appear to be the quality and dedication of the members of the coordinating agency or governing board and the strength of the chief administrator reporting to it.

The conclusion drawn for the criterion of lay representation is as follows:

The maximum potential for lay representation in the coordination and governance of higher education is provided for by the coordinating agency, advisory or regulatory, structure.

State Government Influence. In the two case study states with advisory coordinating agencies, state government appeared to have considerable confidence in the coordinating agency it had created. The result was a largely

autonomous coordinating activity through which interests of the institutions of higher education received considerable support. With some variation, the three case study regulatory coordinating agencies appeared to be more closely allied with state government interests than with the interests of the colleges and universities. The degree and thrust of state government influence in the four states with consolidated governing boards was more mixed. In one of these states, the state legislature has been very active in the field of higher education. This activity has extended to a number of issues which should perhaps have been left to the consolidated governing board. In another of the four consolidated governing board states, the activity of the legislature in matters affecting higher education has sharply increased in recent years. The general pattern in consolidated governing board states appears to be that, despite constitutional or legislative assignment of broad responsibility for higher education to the consolidated governing board, legislative activity in matters of higher education persists and is, in some cases, considerable. Particularly, in decisions regarding the establishment and location of new campuses or new institutions, political considerations not infrequently override educational ones. However, in some states and on some issues, legislative decisions appear to have had a sounder base in terms of educational philosophy than the decisions of either institutional administrations or their governing boards.

The evidence of the case studies provides the basis for the following conclusion:

State government influences on higher education are most pronounced in regulatory coordinating agency and consolidated governing board systems. But the sources of influences that predominate in higher education decisions are largely determined by the political and economic climate of the state; they are only partially affected by the type of coordinating structure existing there.

Span of Control. The number, sizes, and diversity of types of institutions with which a coordinating agency or governing board deals would be expected to influence the ability of the body to possess the comprehension of the insti-

tutions required for it to effectively discharge its responsibilities. It would also be expected that span of control problems would be magnified in situations in which the central body departs from its exercise of major policy responsibilities and delves into administrative or operational matters.

The evidence from the case studies suggests that span of control problems are minimal in states with advisory coordinating agencies, but begin to emerge in states with the regulatory coordinating agency structure, and are somewhat more severe in consolidated governing board states. The extent of these problems appears to be attributable, at least partially, to the size and complexity of the set of institutions for which the coordinating agency or consolidated board is responsible. Yet, the mere possession of regulatory or governing responsibilities appears to draw regulatory coordinating agencies and consolidated governing boards into the consideration of operating details and program matters of individual institutions. These matters require more intimate knowledge of the institutions than any state-level body can be expected to possess. An exception to this rule was found in only one of the four consolidated governing board states visited. The relatively small number of institutions in this state, and the policy of the board to delegate program responsibilities to the institutions, served to minimize span of control problems in this state.

While the exception needs to be recognized, the general conclusion is still that:

The greater the authority and responsibility assigned a coordinating agency or governing board, the more likely it is that span of control problems will exist.

Costs of Bureaucracy. Any state level coordinating agency or consolidated governing board operation will entail costs to the state for professional staff, operations, and physical facilities. The case studies reveal rather clearly that the magnitude of these costs increased in proportion to the authority and responsibility assigned the central body. The least expensive structure was the advisory coordinating agency. The regulatory coordinating agencies were more costly, and the consolidated governing boards were the most costly of the three structures. This observa-

tion was clear despite the fact that the budgets of the state level bodies were not systematically examined in the case studies. Such an examination would have been difficult because of the variations in the manner in which the activities of the several coordinating or governing bodies are financed.

Furthermore, the cost-structure relationship appears to exist despite the fact that the state-level body can provide for a centralization of some functions which, without the body, would be carried on at the institutional level. Again, without having undertaken detailed analysis of this factor, it appears that the economies that are realized through centralization are small in relation to the total costs of coordination or central governance.

The costs of central coordination and governance are not limited to the direct costs incurred by the central body. The central body and the activities of its staff generate indirect costs at the level of the institution. These costs stem from the need to generate information at the institutional level for use by the central body, and from other forms of interaction between the central body and the individual institutions. These indirect costs appeared in the case study states to vary directly with the direct costs of the central agency or board. The greater the responsibility of the central body, the more staff it requires, and the greater is the activity generated at the level of the institution by the central staff.

The conclusion is as follows:

Costs for staff, operations, and facilities incurred by the central coordinating or governing body vary, at least, in proportion to the authority and responsibility assigned the body. When costs incurred at the institutional level are included, the cost-structure relationship becomes even more pronounced.

Processes of Bureaucracy. State level coordination and governance require meetings, paper flow, and related processes. As was observed with regard to costs, the greater the responsibility of the central body, the greater is the bureaucracy it engenders. Centralization tends to increase the formality

and cumbersomeness of paper flow, red tape, and communication. These conditions led some educational administrators to charge that a bureaucracy had developed that actually hindered effective communication about higher education in states having regulatory coordinating agencies or consolidated governing boards. Educators from junior and newer institutions, and from state colleges, tended to dispute this view, saying that the complaint of their colleagues was in reality a complaint about the outcome of the decision-making process, rather than the extent of communication occurring within that process. In several of the states with regulatory coordinating agencies or consolidated governing boards, there were criticisms of the bureaucratic processes that went beyond the extent of such processes. Representatives of some institutions complained that information requested by the staff of the central body was often inappropriate or, at best, only partially relevant to the purpose for which it was ostensibly sought. Others charged that the purposes for which information was sought frequently were ill-defined and that, in some cases, data were sought to substantiate preconceived positions. Simplistic approaches to the solution of complex problems were cited.

The conclusion is that:

The amount of bureaucracy, and the processes deriving from it, increase as the amount of authority and responsibility of the central coordinating or governing body increases.

Responsiveness. As was the pattern with the preceding two criteria, the case study evidence indicates that the ability of the coordinating agency or governing board to make effective and timely responses to institutional and state-level problems and needs was hampered by the scope of the responsibility assigned to the central body. The advisory coordinating agencies appeared able to respond appropriately in the context of the very limited responsibilities assigned them. However, that response usually was restricted to needs that were defined by and in terms of specific educational institutions. The cumbersomeness, formality, and mechanistic nature of the decision-making processes of the consolidated governing boards in states visited impeded their responsiveness. The preoccupation of several of these state-

level bodies with trivial matters, to the exclusion of major policy considerations, is another factor limiting their responsiveness.

Another dimension of the responsiveness question has to do with the forces and considerations to which the central body responds. The lay members of coordinating agencies and consolidated governing boards are subject to political influence. Indeed, in one of the states visited, political considerations and pressures rather clearly take precedence over educational ones in the determination of the issues to come before the governing board and in the resolution of them. The case study evidence from many of the states visited also indicated that the central body gives some institutions more favored and others less favored treatment in their policy and decision-making. In one state, the more favored institution happened to be the relatively new state university located in the largest metropolitan area of the state. The more typical distinction was between the treatments accorded the established multi-purpose state university or universities and the developing junior colleges and expanding state colleges. In a few states, the prestige and traditional dominance of the public university has continued and the central body still responds to its avowed needs. Representatives of the remaining institutions in such states complained of the treatment accorded them on the basis of their status in the structure of higher education. The more common pattern, however, was one in which the central coordinating or governing body, in attempting to respond to emerging societal needs and problems, gives greater attention to the potential of junior colleges and state colleges to meet such needs and problems. Representatives of the complex, multi-purpose universities in these states complained that they were at a disadvantage in this context, that their universities were having difficulty in continuing to provide traditional forms of service, much less attempting to meet new challenges. The resultant leveling effect, they noted, could only result in harm to their institutions and to the abilities of their institutions to render the forms of service for which they were established.

The conclusion, regarding responsiveness, reached on the basis of the case study evidence may be stated as follows:

The ability of the central coordinating agency or consolidated governing board to make effective and timely responses to institutional and state level needs decreases as the authority and responsibility of the central body increases. The particular structure adopted for state level coordination and governance cannot provide assurance that the resultant body will respond in a manner which is consistent with the overall needs of higher education in a given state.

Agency Staffing. Coordinating agencies and consolidated governing boards employ staff to assist them in the discharge of their responsibilities. The competence of the professional staff of these bodies, and the quality of their work, very clearly influences the effectiveness of the coordinating or governing effort. A number of the individuals interviewed in the case study states remarked that the knowledge and expertise of the professional staff was the single most important factor in determining the success or failure of the efforts of the state-level body. A knowledgeable and competent professional staff is necessary not only for the production of sound staff work, but also for the credibility it brings to the agency in the eyes of its constituencies, which include state government and the institutions it serves.

Instances of adequate or better professional staff were found in some case study states. Instances of less than desirable quality, and of difficulties in recruiting competent staff for the central-office positions, were also found. Problems of agency staffing were no more apparent in the advisory coordinating agency states than in the consolidated governing board states.

A common complaint from the established universities in the case study states was that their senior and middle management staff were, by virtue of the reputations and prestige of these institutions, more able than were the coordinating agency or consolidated governing board professional staff with which these individuals dealt. It was claimed that the central-body staff lacked the intimate familiarity of the higher education enterprise that is gained only through experience at the institutional level. The evidence on

this point suggests that there is considerable validity to these complaints.

The conclusion with regard to the agency staffing criterion is as follows:

As a general rule, advisory coordinating agencies, regulatory coordinating agencies, and consolidated governing boards are equally able to attract competent people to serve on their professional staffs -- competence being assessed relatively in terms of the level of responsibility of the agency or board.

Having presented the case study evidence, and the conclusions drawn therefrom, it is appropriate to compare these findings with the postulated characteristics of the three structures for coordination and governance under study. The postulates were developed independently of the case studies. They are expectations of characteristics of the structures in their "pure" form, assuming no influence from human or other potentially modifying factors. The case studies may be viewed as empirical tests of the system of postulates developed and presented in Chapter II.

Figure 4 (P. 48) provides a graphic summary of the postulated characteristics and of the conclusions drawn from the case studies in terms of the 13 evaluative criteria for each of the three structures for coordination and governance. It allows the postulates and case study conclusions to be compared.

The graphic presentation of Figure 4 oversimplifies both the postulated characteristics and the case study findings. The qualifications, exceptions, and nuances of the case study findings, particularly, must be kept in mind as the graphic summary is examined. With regard to the postulates (hatched in the bar-graph figure), a bar extending only through Does Not Meet Criterion indicates that the structure would be expected to be weak with respect to the given criterion; a bar extending through Meets Criterion indicates that the structure would be expected to possess desirable characteristics with regard to the criterion; a bar extending through Partially Meets Criterion indicates either that the structure would be expected to be intermediate in terms of strengths and weaknesses as suggested by the criterion, or that it was not possible to

specify an unequivocal postulate for the criterion.

The findings of the case studies (represented by solid bars) are parallel indicators of the effectiveness of the structures for coordination and governance with regard to the several evaluative criteria. Again, the bars in the figure severely condense the case study findings and conclusions. Nonetheless, the bar-chart representation does facilitate comparison of the case study evidence with the system of postulates presented in Chapter II.


In 25 of the 39 (three structures times 13 criteria) comparisons of postulates and case study findings, the pairs of bars in Figure 4 correspond in length. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the postulates were substantiated by the evidence from the case studies. This result could be interpreted as indicating that the functioning and effectiveness of a particular structure for coordination or governance can be predicted with some confidence from the organizational characteristics of the structure.

However, this interpretation is brought into question when the comparisons for specific criteria are examined. The greatest agreement between postulates and case study evidence was found for the five criteria relating to "administration" -- Span of Control, Costs of Bureaucracy, Processes of Bureaucracy, Responsiveness, and Agency Staffing. Agreement was also high for the three criteria relating to sources of "influence" -- Institutional Autonomy and Influence, Lay Representation, and State Government Influence. The lack of congruity between postulates and case study findings for the State Government Influence criterion is, however, noteworthy.

Thus, it was with the five "general" criteria -- Program Control, Resource Allocation and Use, Long-Range Planning, Assignment of Responsibility, and Comprehensiveness of Purview -- that the case study findings were least supportive of the postulated strengths and weaknesses of the three structures. Because the first three of these criteria -- Program Control, Resource Allocation and Use, and Long-Range Planning -- concern the substantive components of coordination and governance, the fact that the case study evidence did not confirm the postulates for these criteria is of particular significance.

Figure 4

POSTULATED AND OBSERVED CHARACTERISTICS OF THREE STRUCTURES
FOR COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE ACCORDING
TO EVALUATIVE CRITERIA



Evidently, with regard to these central functions of state-level coordination and governance, there are human factors and other modifying influences which invalidate the specification of coordinating or governing body performance on the basis of structure alone.

The preceding comparison of postulates and case study conclusions leads to a consideration of the two basic hypotheses suggested at the end of Chapter II. The first of these was stated as follows: All other things being equal, each of the basic approaches to governance can be expected to function as specified by the postulates. The "other things" were evidently sufficiently "equal" that for seven of the criteria the postulates were predictive of practice. This finding, in combination with some instances in which the case study results for individual states were in general accord with the postulates for others of the 13 criteria, is supportive of the hypothesis as stated. It may be concluded that, given a certain mix of human and other influence, the organization for coordination and governance of higher education at the state level is predictive of the manner in which the organization will function.

The second hypothesis was stated as follows: All other things are not equal. Human, economic, and political influences are strong modifiers affecting processes and accomplishments. While structure must provide a minimum framework within which people can effectively work, the modifying influences are significant factors in the success or failure of any particular approach to governance. The lack of congruence between the postulates and the case study findings for the substantive criteria of Program Control, Resource Allocation and Use, and Long-Range Planning provides strong support for this hypothesis. The agreement between postulates and case study findings for others of the criteria do not negate the hypothesis, because of the nature of the other criteria. It is with the three substantive criteria that the human, economic, and political influences would be most expected to operate. For these criteria, the postulates based on organizational structure, alone, were unambiguous. The central case study finding, however, was that, regardless of structure, performance on these criteria was mixed and generally less than adequate. The modifying influences were predominant. The hypothesis was confirmed.

Returning to an examination of Figure 4, what can be concluded regarding the relative overall merits of the three structures for coordination or governance? The predominant pattern of both postulated and observed characteristics is one in which the advisory coordinating agency has the most positive features, the consolidated governing board has the most negative features, and the regulatory coordinating agency has characteristics which place it in an intermediate position.

However, when attention is focused upon the central performance criteria of Program Control, Resource Allocation and Use, and Long-Range Planning, the validity of the easy conclusion is brought into question. On the basis of structure (the postulates), the consolidated governing board would be expected to provide the optimum structure and the advisory coordinating agency to be least satisfactory. Contrary to the expectation of the postulates, no clear superiority of any of the three structures was found in the case study evidence. As a matter of fact, mediocre, at best, performance with regard to these criteria was found to be the rule under all three structures for coordination or governance. Thus, the case study evidence does not provide a basis for a conclusion with regard to these criteria.

The inescapable fact is that effective state-level coordination of higher education is almost synonymous with sound and effective long-range planning, rational and meaningful program control, and prudent and equitable resource allocation. In this sense, effective state-level coordination was not found to exist in the case study states. This does not mean that it cannot be obtained or should not be sought. This argument leads to the conclusion that:

The structure for state-level coordination of higher education to be sought is one which (a) preserves, as far as possible, the advantages of the advisory coordinating agency, as these are revealed by performances on criteria #4 through #13 of this investigation, and simultaneously, (b) enhances the potential for effective performance on the three central criteria of long-range planning, program control, and resource allocation and use.

The strong advisory coordinating agency or one with limited, but significant, regulatory powers is suggested by this conclusion. The specific rec-

ommendations and the rationale for them, presented in the following chapter, provide additional detail to this conclusion.

V

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Most Task Force expectations about the effects of coordinating structure upon higher education policies and performance were borne out by what was learned from the case studies. Yet, some of the propositions contradicted by the case study evidence pertain to evaluative criteria that Task Force members consider to be critically important to the future strength and success of institutions of higher education.

Theoretical considerations led the Task Force to believe that coordinating structures having greater centralization of power would perform appreciably better in the areas of long-range planning, program control, and resource allocation. Quite clearly, this turns out not to be true in the nine states that were examined in some detail for this study. Indeed, the evidence points very strongly to the conclusion that none of these nine state systems of higher education, no matter what the type of coordinating structure in use, has achieved any noteworthy overall success in terms of all three of these criteria.

The Task Force assumed that advisory coordinating agencies could develop sound long-range plans, but that implementation of the plans might be difficult in such systems. Success of the planning efforts in advisory coordinating agency states was expected to hinge upon voluntary compliance by the institutions of higher education, or upon acceptance and implementation of the plan by agencies of state government, particularly the legislature. Presumably regulatory coordinating agencies and consolidated governing boards would have the opposite problem: their power would be sufficient to secure implementation, but the pressure of other responsibilities might so absorb their energies that they would neglect development of the master plan itself.

Judging from the experience of the nine states studied by the Task Force, the following conclusions about this key

coordinating function appear to be warranted: (1) Long-range planning is of generally poor quality in most of the states studied, with the only major exceptions occurring in a few states having advisory or regulatory coordinating commissions. (2) Since state plans for higher education are often so narrow and vague, it is virtually impossible to judge the extent to which they have been implemented. Where judgment is possible, there seems to be little variation in success from one type of coordinating structure to another. (3) While it is true that systems having consolidated governing boards have neglected planning, or done a poor job of it, this may very well be due to factors other than those originally identified by the Task Force.

Perhaps consolidated governing boards fail in this respect, not entirely because of the pressures of other responsibilities, but also because those who have the power to control development do not wish to constrict future choices by elaborating a master plan. They potentially have more direct means for securing institutional compliance, and, therefore, do not need to use the master plan as a device for encouraging cooperation.

The advisory coordinating agency has somewhat better overall success in the area of planning. Yet, it may have so little influence over the colleges and universities in its state that it cannot secure their cooperation in a very meaningful implementation effort. Moreover, this type of coordinating agency often does not have either the size or quality of staff essential for very sophisticated planning.

The regulatory coordinating agency has sufficient staff to mount a planning effort and enough influence to encourage cooperation by the institutions within its purview. Because its powers are somewhat limited, it considers the planning document to be an effective instrument for shaping decisions affecting higher education. For these reasons,

the long-range planning function has been performed most effectively in the regulatory coordinating agency states.

Performance on other program-related functions in the nine case study states has generally been less satisfactory than in the area of long-range planning. Failures are especially evident when interrelationships are considered among the functions embraced within each of the different criteria.

Seldom are institutional missions defined with clarity in terms of a coherent pattern of institutional roles, and with reference to explicit concepts of educational policy. Rarer still are instances in which such definitions are expressly related to earlier planning, or where they serve to guide important resource allocation decisions. Even the establishment of new programs or new institutions of higher education has almost invariably been the result of political, rather than educational considerations. Only recently have any of the case study states begun to question the relative worth and effectiveness of existing programs; none has advanced beyond the first preliminary stages in the creation of a program review system that can assess the achievements of present programs in such a way as to rank them in terms of priorities to be assigned all programs, both existing and proposed.

No state has been able to devise a resource allocation process that rationally distributes funds to institutions and programs on the basis of an overall schema of program responsibility, and in terms of standards for adjudging past program accomplishments. The closest approximation consists of a bewildering array of budgeting formulas ostensibly designed to allocate funds in a rational manner that recognizes differences in the importance and in the funding requirements of various educational programs. There is general agreement that these formulas are much too superficial, that they usually do not achieve the results intended for them, and that they frequently produce harmful, yet largely unforeseen, effects in terms of higher education's overall ability to accomplish its program objectives.

Case study findings also appear to call into question many of the Task Force's assumptions about the effects upon institutional autonomy of the degree of centralization entailed in the regulatory coordinating agency and

consolidated governing board forms. The evidence suggests that individual universities, or university systems operating under such coordinating structures, have maintained virtually complete control over substantive program matters. In this sense, institutional autonomy is merely the reverse side of a coin labelled "program control." Inability to achieve effective program control, and failure of coordinating agencies to shape institutional decisions on important issues of educational policy, are thus partial reflections of weaknesses and failures in the coordinating effort.

Institutional autonomy also implies freedom from unduly restrictive, overly centralized rules affecting operating procedures. This facet of autonomy is virtually identical to another evaluative criterion utilized by the Task Force, namely that which is labelled "processes of bureaucracy." With respect to this dimension, the case studies provide basically supporting evidence for the Task Force's assertion that bureaucratic inefficiencies would become more pronounced as authority becomes more concentrated. The consolidated governing board is apt to experience particularly difficult administrative problems, both because the scope of its responsibilities is so large and because it tends to rely excessively upon formal rules and central clearance to insure control, even on relatively minor administrative matters. Similarly, the case studies tend to confirm the Task Force's initial observation that the advisory coordinating agency would be relatively more responsive to needs of specific educational institutions than would the other forms, and that the regulatory coordinating agencies and the consolidated governing boards would be more responsive to broader, statewide needs, and to new needs not being met by any specific institution, than would the advisory coordinating agency.

A related question has to do with the amount of influence the colleges and universities have had in the making of whatever policy has emanated from the central coordinating agency. The case study evidence suggests that a slight decline in institutional influence on these decisions accompanies an increase in the power conferred upon the central coordinating agency. However, factors other than the type of higher education coordinating structure largely determine the relative influence of the various

participants in educational decision-making. The extent of genuine lay influence, the scope and nature of influence by the legislature and executive offices of state government, as well as the influence exerted by educational institutions--all these are largely shaped by the political, economic, and governmental climate within the state, and not by the coordinating structure. Particularly important features of this climate are the nature and extent of sectional rivalries in the state, the fiscal capacity of the state to meet increasing costs of public services, and the degree of issue-oriented as opposed to patronage-based decision-making in state government. Thus, the pattern of influence affecting the policy-making process for higher education is shaped largely by the nature of the general environment in which that process occurs, not by the organizational features of the specific structure charged with decision-making for public higher education.

The effect of factors other than the type of coordinating structure is most pronounced with respect to the degree and kind of influence exercised by various participants in higher education policy-making. Yet, the case study findings clearly demonstrate that the modifying influences discussed earlier in Chapter II have an important effect in terms of all the evaluative criteria employed by the Task Force. Other features of organizational climate that have the most profound effect upon coordination include the extent of informal relationships prevailing among agencies, and the degree of mutual tolerance and trust existing among educators and those charged with decision-making responsibilities for higher education. Oftentimes, critical importance will be attached to the role of a single individual who occupies a strategic place in the policy-making framework. Thus, structure isn't everything. But neither is it meaningless.

These findings point toward the following conclusions with respect to the efficacy of the three different types of coordinating structure. As presently constituted and empowered, advisory coordinating agencies usually cannot cope with the extremely difficult problems that confront the world of higher education; most have not even faced up to the really formidable questions relating to long-range plan-

ning, program control, and resource allocation. Unlike the advisory coordinating agency, regulatory agencies and consolidated governing boards have at least made some effort to find solutions to the pressing issues relating to program content and development. Yet, their accomplishments with respect to these issues have often come at much too high a price. Administrative and policy-making processes are frequently too time consuming, expensive, and overly bureaucratized, particularly in the consolidated governing board form. Those drawbacks, together with its signal lack of achievement in the area of long-range planning, strongly support the conclusion that the accomplishments possible under the consolidated governing board structure are more than offset by the adverse effects resulting from over-centralization of power. Furthermore, in states with very large or complex post-secondary educational systems, the consolidated board alternative places in the hands of a single agency many more responsibilities than it can intelligently or effectively discharge.

However, a viable framework for coordination in higher education can be developed by combining elements of both the advisory and regulatory coordinating agency forms. Care must be taken though, to avoid the principal defects of the two forms. The advisory agency form often is ineffective because there is too great a dispersal of power among participants in higher education policy-making. The regulatory agency system frequently does not produce significant enough results in coordination to make its administrative inefficiencies acceptable. On the positive side, the advisory form preserves institutional autonomy and fosters diversity and flexibility; the regulatory agency form can bring about meaningful coordination among the programs of the various, separate institutions if it can avoid the dysfunctional results that flow from too great a centralization of power.

The preferred solution thus requires the creation of a system characterized by balance. This concept has implications for the integration of policy related inputs along two separate dimensions. First, there must be a balance of power and responsibility among three different elements; the legislature and executive offices of state government; the coordinating agency for higher education; and the institutions of

higher education.¹ The coordinating agency in such a system must have sufficient power to insure that attention is given to broad, statewide public needs that relate to policy matters in higher education. Yet, within the constraints imposed by such broad policies, institutional autonomy and diversity must be maintained, for only when they exist can higher education have the capacity both for meeting present needs and for responding creatively to new demands and needs. Balance also implies that higher education decisions and policy should be shaped by contributions from all types of institutions of higher education in the state. Thus, the coordinating structure must give ample opportunity for representation of the views of junior as well as senior institutions, and of private as well as public colleges and universities.

Beyond providing for balance, an effective coordinating structure should permit each interest that has a legitimate stake in higher education decision-making to perform the function for which it is most appropriately suited. Most matters of an administrative nature are best left to the separate educational institutions, since decisions on such matters can be handled most effectively by relatively small units that have operating program responsibilities. Policy decisions of system-wide import should be the result of extensive interaction among those having program functions at the institutional level. Yet, since interests that extend beyond those of the separate colleges and universities must be effectively represented by a central coordinating body, that agency must have sufficient power to elicit institutional cooperation in both the policy-making and implementing processes.

1

It is, of course, recognized that, constitutionally, public higher education is a component of the executive branch of state organization in Missouri and elsewhere. The Task Force is, however, taking the position that for operating purposes, higher education should relate equally to the executive offices of state government and the state legislature. This attitude, with respect to a balance of power and responsibility, is not inconsistent with the technical assignment of public higher education to the executive branch of state government.

That agency should also have enough prestige that it can become the principal forum for decision-making on major policy matters affecting higher education.

The legislature and executive offices should not be expected to make informed decisions about most specific policy issues in the field of higher education, nor to judge whether a given educational institution is achieving its assigned program objectives. Their proper role is that of evaluating budget requests for programs of public higher education in terms of the relative importance of such programs as compared to other state public services, and in terms of the overall efficiency with which universities and other state agencies have made use of public resources allocated to them in the past.

The key question to be resolved is: Just how much centralization of power is necessary to achieve effective coordination of higher education policy and yet preserve desirable levels of institutional autonomy?

Perhaps the most crucial issue relating to this question is the matter of power over budgets. Should the coordinating agency have complete control over resource allocation, or should it serve only in an advisory role with respect to budget matters? What the Task Force has learned from its case studies suggests to it the wisdom of stopping short of giving any coordinating agency the kind of budgetary authority that would permit it to rule by financial decree. The concept of balance, and the desire to preserve institutional autonomy and diversity, suggest that the coordinating agency's powers should be concentrated in the area of program control. The impact of the coordinating agency upon resource allocation should come by virtue of its role in long-range planning and program control, and as a consequence of the credibility given to its recommendations because of their merit.

In their desire to make absolutely certain that there is greater responsibility and accountability in higher education, many state leaders today embrace the philosophy that centralization of power in the coordinating agency is essential to effective control. They further assume that power inevitably rests on the control of budgets.

The experience of other states suggests that placing controls over the

resource allocation function in the hands of the coordinating agency constitutes a very large first step toward the centralization of control over all functions. For reasons that are not entirely clear, control over the purse strings also appears to lead not just to control over operating and administrative matters, but to preoccupation with the most trivial and mundane aspects of those matters. This pattern is so evident in the states examined by the Task Force that it might be advanced as a "law of administrative trivia" descriptive of certain organizational behavior in the field of higher education coordination: when administrative trivia can find their way onto the coordinating agency (or governing board) agenda, there is a strong likelihood that they will come to dominate the agency's attention.

These considerations have very definite implications for the type of coordination structure that is being advocated by the Task Force. Although only program control and long-range planning powers are being recommended for the coordinating agency, even those powers should be carefully restricted to program matters of major importance, lest the law of administrative trivia also become operative with respect to program control.

The sort of coordinating structure advocated by the Task Force will depend for its success upon a great many things. Its composition, legal basis, and powers must be such that the coordinating agency can have an effective and autonomous role with respect to higher education decisions and policies. Specific features of the coordinating and governing structure should be determined by application of principles drawn from the findings of the Task Force study. Other structural guidelines can be derived logically from the concept of balance, for in that concept are embodied the major findings of the Task Force on the issues most pertinent to higher education.

The principles and guidelines which the Task Force considers to be most important are as follows:

(1) Purview of Coordinating Agency

The coordinating agency should have purview over and responsibility for all segments of higher education in the state, including public and private junior and senior colleges and universities.

(2) Composition of Coordinating Agency

In order to insure its autonomy, the central coordinating agency should consist only of lay members appointed by the Governor with the approval of the upper house of the state legislature.

(3) Advisory Structure

However, provision should be made for the fullest possible communication among all of those directly concerned with higher education programs and policies. Standing and ad hoc advisory committees should permit the viewpoints of all types of institutions of higher education to be introduced into the policy-making process on all matters pertaining to long-range planning, program review, funding, and other aspects of coordination and governance.

(4) State Government Liaison

Means should also be established for fostering regular communication between the coordinating agency and the executive offices and legislature of the state.

(5) Institutional Involvement

Attainment of balance requires that no single type of educational institution have a preponderant influence over higher education policy-making. This means that governing arrangements for the different types of public institutions should be such that each major type enters the policy-making arena on a roughly equivalent basis.

(6) Legal Basis of Coordination and Governance

Balance also depends upon the coordinating agency and the governing boards of public institutions having comparable legal status. All should have a constitutional basis, or none should have. Preferably, all should have a constitutional standing, as befits an area of public service that is unique among the functions of state government and that must have considerable independence from executive and legislative control if it is to perform its vital role in our society.

(7) Defining Powers of Coordinating Agency

The respective powers of the coordinating agency and the governing boards should be defined as carefully as possible, primarily in order to stress the desirability of limiting functions of the coordinating agency to major policy matters, and explicitly to reserve to the institutional governing boards all powers not assigned to the coordinating agency.

(8) Powers and Responsibilities of Coordinating Agency

The coordinating agency should have as its principal responsibilities:

- (a) The development and continual review and updating of a long-range master plan for higher education in the state and in sub-regions of the state;
- (b) Review of, and the power to approve or disapprove establishment of new institutions or major programs of higher education; review of existing programs, together with power to recommend their further development, consolidation, or elimination;
- (c) Advise the Governor and the state legislature with respect to general conditions and needs of higher education in the state; and make specific recommendations on the capital and operating fund requirements of the individual public institutions. The agency's budget recommendations should also include an assessment of the extent to which the institution has complied with previous recommendations made by the agency.

- (d) Serve as official state agency for all federally funded programs that require such an agency.

(9) Funding and Staffing

The coordinating agency must be funded at a level that will enable it to carry out its responsibilities. In particular, the level of funding must enable employment of a staff which is adequate in number and quality to the duties it will be assigned.

(10) Modifying Influences

The design of specific institutional arrangements for coordination and governance should recognize that there are important differences from state to state in the factors that bear on coordination. Since no one institutional pattern will suffice for all states, the details of the coordinating structure should be shaped in light of the particular setting in which it will function.

The role of the coordinating agency must be accepted by educators and administrators in the colleges and universities, and by members of the state's legislature and executive offices. For any of these to insist that the coordinating agency should serve as its spokesman, and as a representative of its interests, would insure the failure of the coordinating effort. That would lead, in turn, to an escalation of politics surrounding coordinating activity, and very probably to a greater centralization of power as a means to secure effective coordination. In the light of what has been learned in this study, that would be a most unfortunate underdevelopment.

The Task Force's conclusions on this issue bear a striking resemblance to those advanced by Lyman A. Glenny, Robert O. Berdahl, Ernest C. Palola, and James C. Paltridge in Coordinating Higher Education for the '70s; Multi-campus and Statewide Guidelines for Practice (18). Their investigations, conducted over more than a decade in some 35 states, apparently turned up evidence very similar to that discovered by the Task Force in its more recent examination of

the coordination function in nine states.²

Perhaps of even greater significance is the sense of urgency that both studies appear to have fostered among their authors. This Task Force's findings are in complete agreement with the assessment of Glennly and his col-

leagues with respect to the alternatives now available to institutions of higher education. They remark: "The choice today is not between strengthening the coordinating board or retaining the status quo. Rather, the choice is between creating an effective coordinating board. . . or seeing public higher education ingested into the executive branch of state government."

2

Since the Glennly study did not report any of the empirical evidence that had led its authors to adopt the conclusions stated in their report, the Task Force considered it to be of value largely because it constituted one of several major statements relating to a philosophy of coordination in the field of higher education. After the Task Force had gathered and evaluated evidence from its own case

studies, and drew upon that evidence to construct recommendations for a Missouri coordinating structure, it became apparent that the process of gathering and analyzing its own evidence had led it to come independently to the same general conclusions that had been reached by Glennly and his colleagues. The similarities extend even to many of the recommendations of the Task Force Report.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION FOR SELECTED PERIODS, 1959-60 THROUGH 1971-72, FOR STATES GROUPED BY TYPE OF COORDINATING STRUCTURE

Tables A-2 through A-4 present data on state appropriations for higher education for every third fiscal year, starting with 1959-60 and ending with 1971-72. Expenditures are given for a state in a specific year only if the state had the same type of higher education coordinating structure in that year and in either the preceding or the following year included in this analysis. In computing dollar and percentage expenditure gains for a specific category of states, appropriation gains are computed only for those states whose coordinating structures were of that type for both of the years being compared. Thus, the total gain between 1959-60 and 1962-63 for appropriations in states with advisory coordinating agencies (See Table A-2) is the difference in the total amount appropriated for the states of Kentucky, Virginia, and Wisconsin in 1959-60 and the total amount appropriated for those same states in 1962-63. This difference (\$33,371,000) which is the amount of gain in annual appropriations over this three year interval, constitutes some 48 percent of the total

appropriations in the earlier year, 1959-60.

The following summary of these data (Table A-1) reveals that there are basically similar patterns of gains in higher education appropriations for both the regulatory coordinating agency and consolidated governing board states. Although the rate of increase is consistently higher for the former category, states in both groups experienced their highest rates of gains in the middle 1960s, followed by a levelling off or slight decline in their appropriations' growth rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Gain rates in the advisory coordinating agency states also were highest in the middle 1960s, but instead of levelling off, the rate of increase in higher education appropriations dropped substantially in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Aside from this more precipitous decline of growth in the later years, the advisory agency states experienced more moderate rates of gain in appropriations than states having the regulatory coordinating agency or the consolidated governing board forms.

Table A-1

SUMMARY DATA ON GAIN TRENDS IN STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION BY TYPE OF COORDINATING STRUCTURE*

Type of Coordinating Structure	Percentage gain in Annual State Appropriations			
	1959-60 to 1962-63	1962-63 to 1965-66	1965-66 to 1968-69	1968-69 to 1971-72
Advisory Coordinating Agency States	48%	65%	76%	40%
Regulatory Coordinat- ing Agency States	47%	83%	67%	66%
Consolidated Coordi- nating Board States	26%	61%	60%	52%

*All data on state appropriations presented in this Appendix came from M.M. Chambers, "Appropriations of State Tax Funds for Operating Expenses of Higher Education," Office of Institutional Research, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, Washington, D.C. Data compiled by Chambers are issued annually.

These data do not suggest the existence of a very strong relationship between type of coordinating structure and the rate of change in the amount of funds appropriated for higher education for the period since 1960.

Unfortunately, neither these data nor any data that are now available, provide a very satisfactory answer to the question of whether state expenditures for higher education vary significantly from one type of coordinating structure to another. As simple as that question sounds, a satisfactory answer to it will have to await the development of much better statistics on higher education expenditures. The most widely reported data are those on the amount of funds appropriated for higher education in each of the states. Yet, it would be highly misleading merely to compare the total appropriations for states in each of the three coordinating structure

categories, since there is considerable variation from state to state in the number of public institutions of higher education and the size of the student population served by them. This could be overcome by stating expenditures in per capita terms, but the weaknesses of that particular measure have been criticized.¹

Other approaches to the creation of reliable indicators of higher education expenditures would require precise data on state appropriations per full-time equivalent student. These approaches are not feasible for the simple reason that there are no reliable data on public university enrollments by states.² It is, therefore, impossible to present very compelling evidence on the relation, if any, between type of coordinating structure and the level of overall expenditures on public higher education.

Table A-2

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND GAINS FOR SELECTED INTERVALS, 1959-60 THROUGH 1971-72, IN STATES WITH ADVISORY COORDINATING AGENCIES (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	1959-60	1962-63	1965-66	1968-69	1971-72
Arkansas		16,599	28,722	44,547	52,177
California		243,808	413,103	637,788	853,622
Kentucky	14,954	29,573	49,507	82,350	120,489
Maryland		29,809	48,217	79,742	141,913
Michigan			176,380	262,424	379,409
Minnesota			65,211	105,131	164,566
Missouri			62,168	112,764	149,109
Pennsylvania			80,000	264,693	347,483
South Carolina		15,440	21,403	39,645	74,987
Virginia	19,943	28,859	40,830	107,524	153,433
Wisconsin	34,834	44,670			
TOTAL	69,731	408,758	985,541	1,736,608	2,437,188
Amount of Gain*	33,371	237,694	751,067	700,580	
Percentage Gain**	48%	65%	76%	40%	

* Amount of Gain in annual appropriation for 3-year interval, comparing only those states in category both years.

** Gain in annual appropriation for 3-year interval, as percentage of appropriation for earlier year.

1

See Office of Research and Information, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, FYI: For Your Information, Circular No. 173, March 13, 1972.

2

Various aspects of this problem are discussed in several letters to the editor appearing in the November 11, 1971 Chronicle of Higher Education.

Table A-3

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND GAINS FOR SELECTED INTERVALS,
1959-60 THROUGH 1971-72, IN STATES HAVING COORDINATING AGENCIES WITH REGULATORY POWERS
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1965-66</u>	<u>1968-69</u>	<u>1971-72</u>
Colorado			44,073	70,586	113,463
Connecticut			31,060	61,513	111,695
Illinois	88,139	113,043	204,403	301,136	470,413
Massachusetts			35,000	69,097	130,212
New Jersey			50,826	95,047	184,679
New Mexico	11,165	14,372	21,649	31,262	45,307
New York	75,096	156,556	283,722	482,986	803,913
North Carolina	28,269	36,532	76,323	114,709	223,486
Ohio			85,045	174,136	293,677
Oklahoma	27,014	30,020	41,867	52,858	79,331
Tennessee				73,137	114,034
Texas	65,843	83,282	165,301	259,425	418,369
Wisconsin			<u>78,451</u>	<u>155,957</u>	<u>226,403</u>
TOTAL	295,526	433,805	1,117,720	1,941,849	3,214,982
Amount of Gain*	138,279	359,460	750,992	1,273,133	
Percentage Gain**	47%	83%	67%	66%	

Table A-4

STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND GAINS FOR SELECTED INTERVALS,
1959-60 THROUGH 1971-72, IN STATES WITH CONSOLIDATED GOVERNING BOARDS (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>1962-63</u>	<u>1965-66</u>	<u>1968-69</u>	<u>1971-72</u>
Alaska	2,111	3,301	6,108	10,400	19,500
Arizona	13,742	20,422	35,459	55,121	97,514
Florida	37,263	46,043	95,476	156,645	247,540
Georgia	24,058	32,162	50,859	112,524	162,953
Hawaii	6,277	10,778	17,006	30,987	59,866
Idaho	8,799	10,137	15,490	20,601	34,167
Iowa	34,230	38,914	61,284	85,773	119,881
Kansas	25,036	35,038	48,598	69,108	84,313
Maine				17,873	30,741
Mississippi	13,480	17,500	25,931	47,804	84,112
Montana	11,230	11,161	14,749	24,418	30,635
Nevada	3,682	5,299	7,114	12,339	18,642
New Hampshire			7,335	10,221	12,935
North Dakota	9,253	10,386	13,989	19,888	26,999
Oregon	28,719	33,423	49,252	67,984	103,000
Rhode Island	4,477	7,697	12,868	21,545	30,443
South Dakota	8,078	8,702	15,987	17,152	21,844
Wyoming	<u>4,735</u>	<u>5,599</u>	<u>8,771</u>		
TOTAL	235,170	296,562	486,276	780,383	1,185,085
Amount of Gain*	61,392	182,379	285,005	404,702	
Percentage of Gain**	26%	61%	60%	52%	

* Amount of Gain in annual appropriation for 3-year interval, comparing only those states in category both years.

** Gain in annual appropriation for 3-year interval, as percentage of appropriation for earlier year.

Appendix B

SALARIES OF COORDINATING AGENCY AND CONSOLIDATED GOVERNING BOARD CHIEF EXECUTIVES COMPARED WITH SALARIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES

The salary level of the chief staff or executive officer of the state-level coordinating or governing body is a significant variable for several reasons. For one thing, it is a measure of the cost of the central coordinating or governing effort. In this regard, it is not only indicative by itself, but also is suggestive of the number and salary levels of other members of the central body professional staff. A well-paid executive is likely to have a sizeable and well-paid staff.

The salary of this chief executive is also indicative of the level of responsibility and prestige associated with the position. Similarly, it provides at least one measure of the competency and stature expected of the occupant of the position. It may also be viewed as an indicator of the relative ease or difficulty the central body will have in filling the position with an able and knowledgeable leader and administrator.

Table B-1 (P. 66) was prepared from salary data collected and reported by the Education Commission of the States.¹ These data are presented here as frequency distributions of ratios between the salary of the chief executive officer of the state-level coordinating or governing body and the highest and lowest salaries of chief institutional officers. Median ratios are shown. The data are shown separately for the 14 advisory coordinating agency states (Type B), 11 regulatory coordinating agency states (Type C), and 15 consolidated governing board states (Type D) for which the salary data were available.

1

The Education Commission of the States, Staffing and Salary Information, Statewide Coordinating or Governing Agencies, 1971-72. Higher Education Services Division, 1860 Lincoln Street, Suite 300, Denver, Colorado, April 1972. (mimeo)

The Table B-1 data show that there are differences in the salaries of central body chief executive officers compared with the salaries of institutional presidents. All six frequency distributions of the ratios overlap, but the tendency is for the chief officer of consolidated governing boards to be paid the highest relative salary, and the chief officer of the advisory coordinating agency to be the least well paid on the comparative scale. This finding is not surprising, considering the variation in responsibilities typically assumed by the different categories of executive officers.

The variation in the lowest-institutional-officer-salary ratios almost certainly derives from the variety of types of individual institutions at this end of the president's salary scale. The only observation to be made from these data is that, even for the advisory coordinating agencies, the median ratio is 1.03, indicating that the "average" advisory agency executive officer is paid as well as the institutional president in his state with the lowest salary.

The variation in the highest salary comparison ratios is more interesting. This variation is least for the regulatory coordinating agency states. The greater spread of ratios for the advisory coordinating agency states probably derives from the greater ranges of responsibilities of these types of agencies. The greater range of ratios for consolidated governing board states occurs because, in several of the smaller states with this structure, the chief board officer serves as an "executive secretary" or "executive director", carrying less responsibility than do the "chancellors" who are clearly the chief executive and administrative officers in their states. The latter types of officers can be identified by salaries that are at least the same as, and usually higher than, those of the highest salaried university president in the state.

Table B-1

SALARIES OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF STATE COORDINATING
AND GOVERNING BODIES COMPARED WITH HIGHEST
AND LOWEST SALARIES OF INSTITUTIONAL
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
1971-72 SALARIES

Salary of State Level Officer Compared with Salary of
Institutional Officer With

Ratio**	Highest Salary			Lowest Salary		
	Type B*	Type C*	Type D*	Type B*	Type C*	Type D*
2.00+				1	1	1
1.90-1.99						
1.80-1.89				1		2
1.70-1.79						
1.60-1.69				1	1	3
1.50-1.59						1
1.40-1.49					2	
1.30-1.39				2	3	1
1.20-1.29			1	1		
1.10-1.19			1		2	2
1.00-1.09	1	1	5	3		1
.90- .99	1	1	3	4	2	2
.80- .89	1	5	1			1
.70- .79	3	1	1			
.60- .69	5	3	2			1
.50- .59	1		1	1		
.40- .49	2					
No. of States	14	11	15	14	11	15
Median Ratio	.67	.80	.98	1.03	1.36	1.33

*Type B - States with advisory coordinating agencies
Type C - States with coordinating agencies with regulatory powers
Type D - States with consolidated governing boards

**Ratio of salary of state-level officer to salary of institutional chief executive (president or chancellor).

Appendix C

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE MISSOURI COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION

The recommendation of the State Reorganization Commission of Missouri to alter the form of state-level coordination of higher education in Missouri could be read as implying that the Missouri Commission on Higher Education has performed inadequately. It is thus appropriate to offer at least a brief summary enumeration of accomplishments of the Commission. This enumeration is as follows:

1. A first master plan (1966) for higher education in Missouri was developed. Sections of it have been, from time to time, updated. The plan has had an influence on the development of higher education in the state. A second coordinated plan is now near completion.

2. In addition to collecting and publishing information in a series of periodic statistical reports, the Commission has sponsored and published an array of special in-depth studies on such topics as organized occupational education, graduate education, private higher education, medical education, public junior college education, dental education, and optometric education. In several instances, such studies have provided bases for specific recommendations in the areas studied by the Commission and have, thus, influenced the course of higher education in the state.

3. An institution-by-institution inventory of academic degree programs recently has been developed and published and is being kept up to date.

4. The Commission recently has developed and published sets of criteria for new baccalaureate, masters, and doctors degree programs, and has developed reporting procedures whereby it may obtain information relevant to the criteria for new program proposals. It may be expected that these procedures will strengthen the Commission's ability to respond to its charge to review and make recommendations on new programs.

5. Since its inception, the Commission has reviewed institutional legislative budget requests and has provided its

recommendations thereon to the executive and legislative branches of state government. This Commission activity has contributed to more responsible budget development and appropriations at the state level.

6. An ad hoc advisory committee on the restudy of the formula system for developing budget recommendations recently has been appointed. It may be anticipated that the efforts of this committee will lead to improvements in the manner in which the Commission discharges its responsibilities in this area.

7. The Commission has stimulated increased institutional sensitivity to the costs of higher education and the need for effective controls and management tools.

8. The Commission has made a number of specific recommendations to institutional governing boards and to state government on such matters as admissions requirements and the residency classification of students for fee purposes. It is studying the establishment of uniform student fees and tuition rates.

9. A state-wide inventory of the physical space of institutions of higher education has been developed, space utilization studies have been completed, and recommendations on capital budgets have been rendered by the Commission.

10. The Commission has served as a vehicle for securing and administering considerable amounts of federal financial support for programs and facilities. It has vigorously pursued its pioneer program in the acquisition of federal excess property in behalf of the institutions and the state.

11. The Commission has stimulated coordination between public and private higher education and has provided a medium for communication among all segments of higher education in the state.

12. The activities of the Commission have been conducted with a minimum of bureaucracy and cost to the state.

These accomplishments must be viewed in light of the limitations in the performance and effectiveness of the Missouri Commission on Higher Education. An enumeration of such limitations follows:

1. The accomplishments of the Commission have been limited by the funds made available for its activity. Greater financial support and improved staffing could be expected to enhance the ability of the Commission to provide effective state-level coordination of higher education by more vigorous pursuit of its statutory charge.

2. The division of responsibility between the Commission and the State Board of Education for the supervision

and coordination of public junior and community colleges has curtailed the ability of the Commission to provide effective coordination within and between this segment of higher education as well as other segments.

3. The postures of the General Assembly and of the executive offices of state government have not at all times been responsive to the assigned role of the Commission, nor to its recommendations. Similarly, there have been instances of institutional indifference to Commission recommendations. Unfortunately, and perhaps through little fault of its own, these factors have impinged upon the effectiveness and credibility of the Commission.

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